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Case Study o f the Indianapolis Water Company, Indianapolis, Indiana
Chairperson: Dr. Neva Hassanein—^^y^f^
The privatization of water by transnational corporations (TNCs) has been a growing
trend around the globe in recent years. Due to this trend, a handhil of TNCs have come to
dominate the water market. Recently, they moved into one of the world’s largest
economies, the United States. One U.S. city, Indianapolis, Indiana, entered into a publicprivate partnership with TNC Veolia for the management of its water utility, the
Indianapolis Water Company, in April 2002. This study investigates the details o f this
partnership and the “authenticity” of public participation throughout the decision-making
process to form the partnership and in following years (King, Felty, and O’Neill 1998).
Public participation in the decision-making process to form the partnership was
characterized by a lack o f transparency, poor timing of the participation, and a lack of
public outreach, indicating “unauthentic” participation overall. This mirrors many of the
cautions found in public participation literature. The first two and a half years of the
partnership have produced mixed results with respect to authentic participation. While a
lack o f transparency and public outreach continues, positive developments have also
occurred. These include Veolia’s support for public input into its operations, the
continuing growth of advisory groups, and the coimection between the Citizen’s
Advisory Group’s evaluation of Veolia and a percentage of Veolia’s incentive payments.
Whether these new developments will produce authentic public participation remains to
be seen.
The rWC partnership offers interesting insights into traditional definitions of “public”
and “private.” In this case, study participants perceived the public partner negatively
overall with regards to public participation, while Veolia, the private partner, was
perceived to be more welcoming to public input. Concerns about utility employees are
not adequately addressed in the literature, and have been a contentious and important
issue in this case. Further case studies, comparisons across case studies, and more
investigation into public participation in these partnerships would be useful for increased
understanding of water privatization in the U.S.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A new phrase was recently coined. In 2000, people in Cochabamba, Bolivia
began to talk about “leasing the rain.” Leasing the rain? Controlling water that falls out of
the sky? It turns out their perception was entirely correct. A transnational corporation had
recently taken control of the water supply in Cochabamba. People who for centuries had
freely collected and used rainfall as their water source were now forbidden to do so
without proper payment. Those connected to the main water supply system saw their
water rates increase dramatically. Understandably upset for these and other reasons, the
people of Cochabamba took to the streets in protest, leading to the eventual withdrawal of
the corporation and the return of the water supply to public hands. While this is an
abbreviated version of events, the story of Cochabamba is perhaps the most well-known
and often-cited example o f a new phenomenon in the ongoing quest to provide clean
water to the world’s people: the privatization of water into the hands of transnational
corporations.
Throughout its tenure, water privatization has seen both success and failure. It has
made a handful of corporations powerful and rich. It has been both the subject of
passionate protest and touted as the answer to the world’s water problems. It has forged
relationships and spawned leaders on both sides of an often-contentious debate. In
addition, it has recently expanded into one of the world’s largest economies, the United
States.
While many U.S. citizens have likely never heard of Cochabamba, increasing
numbers o f them have something in common with these Bolivians: the management of
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their water supply by a transnational corporation (TNC). One such group of U.S. citizens
are the customers of the Indianapolis Water Company (IWC) in Indianapolis, Indiana. In
April 2002, the City of Indianapolis simultaneously bought the IWC (which was until
then a shareholder-owned private corporation) and contracted out management of its
operations to USFilter, a subsidiary o f French-based TNC Vivendi Environment (now
known as Veolia). There are, then, some important differences between the two cities.
Cochabamba’s water was owned and managed by a TNC whereas the IWC is now
publicly owned and privately managed. The concept of “leasing the rain” per se is not an
issue in Indianapolis as it was in Cochabamba. One aim o f this study, therefore, is to
further investigate the IWC partnership, including how it was formed and its ongoing
dynamics. While both cities are part of the larger trend of water privatization, this study
focuses on water privatization in the U.S. and specifically the partnership in Indianapolis,
Indiana.
Around the globe, water has traditionally been a public resource or public good.
Water is a resource required by all living things; thus, throughout history its management
has tended to be entrusted to governments. If people live beyond the boundaries of
established cities, or are not interested in being connected to an established water supply
infrastructure, they have usually been free to collect water on their own or sink a well for
their own use. Certainly, there are important issues of water rights, including surface and
subsurface rights, which also play into some situations. In general, however, private
involvement in supplying water has been limited to small-scale operations, and has been
regulated by public agencies. With more large scale involvement of the private sector,
and especially TNCs, in recent years, how the public will continue to be involved in their
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water supply in these situations has become unclear. When water is publicly owned and
managed, there are usually clear guidelines for public input and involvement in decision
making. When water is publicly owned and privately managed, as in the case of
Indianapolis, do these guidelines change? Are new policies for public involvement put
into place? Does the public have input into decision-making of both the public and
private partners? While these questions will no doubt be answered differently in different
locations, this study is an effort to begin answering them with respect to one place.
The main goals of the study, then, are two-fold: 1) to investigate the details of
how the Indianapolis Water Company is now publicly owned and privately managed in
Indianapolis, Indiana and, 2) to determine whether public participation has been
“authentic” in the IWC partnership (King, Felty and O’Neill 1998; a discussion of what is
meant by “authentic” occurs in Chapter Two). Thus, this study seeks to answer the
question: to what extent were public participation processes authentic in the formation of
the IWC partnership, and what are the prospects for ongoing authentic participation as the
partnership continues? To answer this overarching research question, I formulated four
sub-questions:
1) How do key players in Indianapolis view the decision-meiking process to form
the public-private partnership for the IWC, including what went well, concerns,
and opportunities for public involvement?
2) What are the views o f key players on why Indianapolis decided to form a
public-private partnership for the IWC, as compared to other management
options?
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3) What do key players see as the main benefits and concerns about the
partnership during its first two and a half years of existence?
4) How do key players view the ongoing avenues for public participation in the
partnership?

Through thorough investigation of these questions and the overarching central research
question, I hope to describe and analyze the IWC partnership through the voices of key
players there.
The temporal scope of this study is from when the City of Indianapolis decided to
buy the IWC in July 2001 through August 2004, when the interviews o f key players took
place. While relevant background information about water privatization in the U.S. is
presented in Chapter Two, this study is concerned primarily with the events in
Indianapolis, and the views, perspectives, and opinions of key players in the IWC
partnership.

Personal Motivations
Before outlining the subsequent chapters of this thesis, I want to briefly explain
my personal motivations for this study and its design. I have an ongoing interest in
corporations in general, along with the growth of a small group of transnational
corporations that have amassed an incredible amount of power and wealth in recent years.
When I first learned o f their involvement in water supply systems in the Third World, I
was intrigued by this development and possible negative consequences for the world’s
poor. 1 strongly believe in water as a human right, something that every living thing is
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entitled to, even if the water’s cost has to be subsidized by governments. Thus, I was
interested in how low-income populations are being affected by the involvement of the
private sector in their water supply. Investigation into water privatization in the Third
World inevitably led to the recent development of water privatization in the U.S., my
own country. Wanting to learn more about how TNCs had entered the U.S and where
they were operating, I began some initial background research. This research led,
however, to minimal information o f any depth or substance, especially with regards to
descriptions of U.S. cities that had privatized their water. My exposure to qualitative
research and in-depth interviews contributed to a desire to learn more about the actual
experiences and perspectives o f people who have been involved with and impacted by
water privatization in the U.S. I am also a fan of story-telling and wanted to tell the story
of a particular city and its experience with water privatization. Lastly, my initial
background research indicated that an in-depth case study might be useful to the larger
literature on these topics and could perhaps provide some useful lessons for others in the
future.

What’s To Come?
The bulk o f this thesis is presented in the following five chapters. Chapter Two is
a review of relevant literature on privatization in general, water privatization in particular,
and public participation. This includes background on water privatization in the Third
World, the entry of TNCs into the U.S. water industry, and theoretical and scholarly
research on public participation and privatization. Chapter Three is a description of the
study design and methodology, including a more thorough description of the critical
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events in Indianapolis. Chapters Four and Five present the research findings. Chapter
Four addresses study participants’ perspectives on the decision-making process to buy the
IWC and form the public-private partnership. Chapter Five focuses on the first two and a
half years of the partnership and ongoing avenues for public participation. Finally,
Chapter Six synthesizes the relevant background information and research findings,
closing with possible implications and conclusions.
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CHAPTER TWO
U.S. WATER PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN CONTEXT
To provide a thorough framework for this study, this chapter reviews the
historical, political, social, and theoretical contexts of both water privatization and public
participation. Without context, it is difficult to view the public-private partnership in
Indianapolis outside of its own small scale. Thus, this chapter will describe and evaluate a
series o f topics that will lead to a more thorough justification for this study. Through
reviewing the relevant literature, the purpose of this study and what it will add to this
supporting material will become clear. The bulk of this chapter will deal with water
privatization, followed by discussion of the role and importance of public participation,
with the intersection of these two topics forming the conclusion.
First, I briefly discuss the current global water crisis and the debate revolving
around water as a right or need. These topics are philosophically more relevant to the
global scale, rather than the local scale of Indianapolis; however, they also represent
larger trends and issues that have directly and indirectly influenced events in Indianapolis
and the perspectives o f key players there. Second, I describe water privatization
internationally, including the role of neoliberalism, the rise of a few transnational
corporations (TNCs) in the water industry, and events that have led these corporations to
seek out new markets in the U.S. Third, I address water privatization in the U.S.,
including a short history of U.S. water utilities, how TNCs have accessed the U.S.
market, other U.S. cities that have engaged in these partnerships, and the existing
literature that has evaluated these partnerships. Finally, 1 discuss the theoretical
foundations for both privatization and public participation. This discussion of theory is
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important for linking this study to the larger academic literature and placing the events in
Indianapolis in a broader theoretical context. It also proves important during the
presentation o f the study findings in Chapters Four and Five when connections are made
between the perspectives of the participants and larger issues in water privatization and
public participation.

Global Water Resources Issues
The Freshwater Crisis
The world is currently in a freshwater crisis. While only i4 of 1 percent of the
world’s water can be used for human consumption, we are further limiting this amount
with pollution, increased consumption, and population growth (Clarke and Barlow 2003).
Currently one billion people lack access to clean water worldwide, with 2.5 billion people
lacking access to adequate sewage and sanitation services (Public Citizen 2003a).
Furthermore, approximately two million people die every year from cholera and diarrhea,
ailments transmitted through unclean water, the vast majority being children (Public
Citizen 2003a). Given this crisis, what is our water being used for? Ten percent of the
world’s water is used by individual households and municipalities, 20-25 percent by
industry, and 65-70 percent for irrigation of primarily industrial farming, with demand
only increasing as the world population grows (Clarke and Barlow 2003). However, the
ten percent used by households and municipalities is often desperately sought after, and
has been the focus of much debate within global institutions.
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Defining Water and Privatization
Water. One such debate revolves around whether water should be considered a
human right or a human need. This boils down to definitions. Defining water as a “right”
leads to one set of policies and laws, such as subsidizing the cost of water for those who
cannot afford it; on the other hand, defining water as a “need” could lead to the denial of
water to those unable to pay for it. Each definition has different consequences, and often,
due to the life-sustaining nature of water itself, these consequences can become an issue
of life and death.
Rothfeder (2002:78) makes this distinction even clearer by arguing:
The question o f right versus need isn’t a tiny semantic distinction or an
intellectual argument with little significance in real life. The day-to-day
living conditions endured by millions of people - and for some, their
survival - as well as the growing gap between water haves and have-nots,
are directly tied to the outcome of the debate over whether water is a right
or a need. Moreover, global water management policies...are being
crafted andfunded based on its conclusions. The clear-cut boundary
between right and need may not be immediately obvious, but upon
reflection the two words are found to be indeed strikingly opposite. A
right is an entitlement; it cannot be denied without sanctions. A need, by
contrast, is something that is both necessary and desired but by no means
guaranteed... Simply put, if water is merely a need, then the existence of a
universal right to enough fi’eshwater for an acceptable quality of life can
be denied [italics added].
Taking Rothfeder’s analysis one step further, since water privatization involves the
private sector, hence issues of private property, it also may allow for the exclusion of
people’s access to the property (water) in question. As one participant in this study noted,
“Private gives you the right to exclude people.” Whether this exclusion is actually
occurring depends on the location in question and the policies and laws of specific
governments. Even a cursory look at water privatization cases around the globe indicates
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that water privatization has limited people’s access to clean water, and a source of this
limited access may ultimately extend back to something as simple as how water is
defined (see Finnegan 2002 for a discussion of Cochabamba, Bolivia and Vogt 2003 for
information on Johannesburg, South Africa).
Rothfeder (2002) continues by describing how even the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, passed by the United Nations in 1948, does not explicitly declare water a
human right. As a result, both the World Bank and the United Nations (UN) have defined
water as a “human need,” the World Trade Organization (WTO) as an economic “good,”
the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) as an “investment,” and the
General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) as an “environmental service” (Barlow
and Clarke 2002). All of these definitions enable private corporations to treat water as a
commodity and use international trade rules and policies to support their entry into the
water market. Given that global water management policies are being designed based in
part on how we define water, these policies have also enabled a small set of TNCs to gain
a considerable amount of wealth, influence, and power in the water market (Rothfeder
2002). These TNCs are discussed further below.

Privatization. Defining privatization is also important. It is an often-used and
often-murky term that can mean a variety of things in various contexts. The word
“privatization” in the context of water is defined by Gleick et al. (2003 :1) as “transferring
some or all of the assets or operations of public water systems into private hands” (a more
general discussion of privatization occurs in the second half of this chapter). The key
words in this definition are “some or all,” as privatization can mean a spectrum of
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arrangements between private and public entities. Corporations can actually own the
water system and the water resources, meaning that the only way to gain control is to buy
the water system back. The more common form of privatization is a “public-private
partnership” where the public retains ultimate control o f the water system but
management of the system is contracted out or leased to a corporation for a specified
amount of time. This is an important distinction. Privatization does not necessarily mean
ownership, as is commonly thought. Especially in the U.S., the most frequent form of
new water privatization is a public-private partnership, where the water utility remains
publicly owned but is operated and/or managed by a private partner. The National
Council for Public-Private Partnerships, based in the U.S. (NCPPP 2003:1), describes this
arrangement as a:
.. .contractual agreement between a public agency (federal, state or local)
and a for-profit corporation. Through this agreement the skills and assets
o f each sector.. .are shared in delivering a service or facility for the use of
the general public. In addition to the sharing of resources, each party
shares in the risks and rewards potential in the delivery of the service or
facility.
How specifically the public agency and the corporation “share” responsibilities, revenues,
risks, rewards, and accountabilities is not specified in this definition. Therefore, each
example o f privatization is different.
The watchdog group Public Citizen (2003b), on the other hand, distinguishes
between “public” and “private” by defining a publicly-controlled utility as providing
universal access and fair procedures (i.e., denying access to water is not an option) and
promoting public participation in operations and decision-making. Contrastingly, a
privately-controlled utility can choose to provide limited access, often challenges
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consumer rights, does not promote public participation, usurps local control, and has
profit as its primary operating motive. As we will see in the case of Indianapolis, these
definitions are perhaps too simplistic. For instance, publicly-controlled utilities do not
necessarily promote public participation, nor do privately-controlled utilities necessarily
inhibit it. It is the potential for these role reversals and new dynamics that this study is in
part addressing.

Water Privatization throughout the Globe
To address the global water crisis, many leaders in the World Bank, the WTO,
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have been promoting and increasingly
requiring privatization of publicly-held water systems. This trend is largely driven by the
rise of neo-liberalism, that is, the economic philosophy of advocating broad adherence to
ffee-market policies and privileging private over state institutions. A short discussion of
these institutions, and how their policies have enabled a few TNCs to gain the vast
majority o f the water market share, is important because it is these same TNCs that are
now operating in the U.S. market, including in Indianapolis. Indeed, according to
Marsden (2003:1), a large investigation by the International Consortium of Investigative
Journalists, “showed that the enormous expansion of these companies could not have
been possible without the World Bank and other international financial institutions.”

The World Bank
The World Bank primarily promotes water privatization in Third World countries
through Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs) that often take the form of loan
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conditions (Shiva 2002). For instance, if a country requests a loan from the World Bank
for improvements to its water supply system, the Bank makes this loan conditional on
“reduced government spending, increased privatization options, and open[ing] up
to .. .foreign investment,” or actually changing the “structure” of the country’s
government and economy (Public Citizen 2003c). To illustrate this, a study by the
International Consortium of Investigative Journalists in 2002 showed that 30 percent of
276 World Bank water supply loans from 1990 to 2002 required privatization, the
majority being in the last five years (Marsden 2003).
Furthermore, two agencies under the World Bank and the IMF, the International
Finance Corporation (IFC) and the Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),
lend exclusively to private corporations for “development” projects such as water
privatization (Public Citizen 2003c). Grusky (2003) contends that historically there have
been a high proportion of loans and guarantees by the IGC and the MIGA towards private
investment in electric and telecommunications utilities (second to banking and finance)
and that they are currently working to increase similar investments in water utilities.
These agencies do not lend to governments or community organizations.
Another role that the World Bank plays is as a self-proclaimed “Knowledge
Bank.” It is regarded by many non-govemmental organizations, academics, development
agencies, and the U.N. as one o f the primaiy sources for information, data, and theories
on Third World countries. Some argue that this role as an information or knowledge
source is one way the World Bank disseminates many of its neo-liberal, market-based
solutions and perspectives (Grusky 2003).

13
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The World Trade Organization
In contrast to the World Bank, the WTO primarily promotes water privatization
through free-trade rules, mainly embodied in the General Agreement on Trades in
Services (GATS). In general, the GATS “promotes free-trade in services, including
water, food, environment, health, education, research, communication, and transport”
(Shiva 2002:93). Some of the policies in the GATS allow corporations to sue countries
when their domestic policies prevent free-market entry, prohibit governments from
making distinctions between local suppliers and transnational corporations, and forbid
governments from requiring corporations to involve or hire local people for their
operations.

The Rise of Global Water Corporations
Through a multitude of mechanisms, but primarily through the policies of the WB
and the WTO described above, a handful o f TNCs have expanded into the global water
market in approximately the last fifteen years. These include the three largest water
corporations: Vivendi Environment, Suez Lyonnaise des Eaux/Ondeo, and RWEAG/Thames (National Research Council 2002). These TNCs have realized that given the
world’s freshwater crisis, their involvement in providing water is a sound long-term
investment and a way to ensure prolonged profits. For instance, Yves Picaud, manager of
African operations for Vivendi, said with respect to the recent interest in the water
market, “I think it’s because it’s a stable one. It’s a long-term one. You have no surprise.
One thing we are sure: everybody drinks water every day, or uses water every day”
(National Public Radio 2003).

14
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Interestingly, many of the TNCs that proclaimed such faith in the “growth
potential,” longevity, and stability o f the water market have recently experienced contrary
results in the Third World. According to Kitchens (2003:26), Suez “wrote down nearly
$500 million of its investment” in Argentina’s water supply in 2002. Furthermore, the
article reports, “With its share price down almost 40% in the past year, and with the
company expected to post a loss for 2002, Suez needs to find ways to increase
profitability.” A new trend to achieve “profitability” is to pull out of partnerships in Third
World countries in favor of investment in more stable economies such as the United
States.

U.S. Water Privatization
A Short History of U S. Water Utilities
Water privatization in the U.S. is not technically new. According to the National
Research Council (NRC 2002), as the Industrial Revolution boomed during the
nineteenth century, larger water systems were needed to accommodate the growing
population. Private water suppliers stepped in to fill the demand. As it became
understood that water was a major vehicle of disease, especially in the expanding cities,
public agencies then began to take over the water supply. The number of water supply
systems in the U.S. grew fi*om 83 in 1850 to over 3,000 by the turn of the 20* century,
when there was an almost even split between public and private systems (Carlisle 1982
and Baker 1948 in NRC 2002). From 1900 on, the number of public systems outpaced
the private ones, with most private companies operating on a smaller scale in rural areas
and public systems serving the larger, more populous metropolitan areas. Furthermore,

15
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the private companies came under the jurisdiction of regulatory commissions in the
1870s. This development was driven by the realization that water companies, like all
utilities, are monopolies. Regulatory commissions imposed financial constraints on the
companies, approved their rate structures, ensured them a reasonable profit margin, and
shielded them from the influence of local politics (NRC 2002). These private companies
were also largely owned by “individuals, families, real estate development firms, or
mobile home park operators,” with only a handful being “public” companies that issued
stock to investors (NRC 2002: 37).
Today, a similar picture exists. There is still a mix of public and private water
utilities in the U.S. The NRC (2002) reported that approximately 54,000 “community
drinking water systems” operate in the U.S., with any water system that serves more than
25 people qualifying as such under U.S. Environmental Protection Agency guidelines.
Approximately 85 percent of these systems serve only 10 percent of the population,
meaning that the majority are quite small (3,300 or fewer people served); the other 15
percent serves 90 percent of the population. The largest systems (347 as of 1999), serving
more than 100,000 people (the class Indianapolis falls in), constitute only 0.6 percent of
the total number of water systems yet they serve 44.3 percent of the population.
According to the NRC (2002), forty-three percent o f U.S. water utilities are public
systems (owned and operated by public governments), 33 percent are private systems,
and 24 percent are ancillary systems (meaning they deliver water but not as their primary
business, such as in a retirement community). Of the private systems, only 22 percent
(approximately 4,000) are investor-owned. Finally, the NRC (2002:15) also notes that
“the actual proportion of water services provided by private water companies, whether
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measured by customers served or by volume of water handled, has remained relatively
steady in the United States since World War II” at approximately 14 percent.
In summary, these statistics emphasize that “privatization” per se is nothing new
to the U.S. Private water utilities have been in existence as long as water utilities have.
The key difference today is the growth o f public-private partnerships, and the increasing
trend of the private partner being an American subsidiary of a transnational corporation,
namely the largest three - Suez/Ondeo, Vivendi Environment, and RWE-AG/Thames mentioned above.

Entering the U.S. M arket
A host of factors make the U.S. an enticing market for these TNCs. These
include: 1) only 14 percent of Americans currently receive their water from a private
corporation, as indicated above, 2) the U.S. has one of the highest rates of water
consumption in the world, 3) the U.S. water market has annual revenues of up to $90
billion, and 4) the U.S. has a relatively stable economy (McConnell 2004; Public Citizen
2003a). This has resulted in almost a complete buyout of U.S. water corporations by
TNCs. Vivendi Environment took over USFilter in 1999, Suez/Ondeo bought United
Water in 1999, and RWE-AG/Thames acquired American Water Works in 2003 (Barlow
and Clarke 2002). These acquisitions have also included various name changes,
divestitures of assets, and mergers, making the tracking of these corporate structures an
ongoing process.
These three TNCs have utilized a multi-pronged approach to access the U.S.
market. This has primarily involved: 1) buying out American companies that are already
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involved with managing various aspects of municipal water systems, and then 2) actively
seeking new contracts with municipalities that are looking for ways to finance and
manage their public water utilities. The first strategy resulted in the transfer of many
water systems in the U.S. to the control of a transnational corporation without any public
input. The second strategy has resulted in a spectrum of public-private partnership
contracts with varying success rates. In the case of Indianapolis, Vivendi Environment
used both strategies. After they bought the corporation USFilter, which already had some
privatization contracts, they then successfully bid on a new contract with Indianapolis. In
addition, the subsequent sale of some o f USFilter’s assets and other internal restructuring
resulted in a recent corporate name change from USFilter to Veolia (the corporation is
referred to by both o f these names in the findings).
These corporations have also made a considerable effort to influence the U.S.
Congress and federal legislation as an indirect strategy to further enable their entry into
the U.S. market. Research conducted by the Center for Public Integrity discovered that
from 1995-2002, the water industry spent almost $2 million on Congressional campaign
contributions, over 50 percent of which came from United Water (Suez) and American
Water Works (RWE-AG). They also spent $2.4 million on lobbying efforts. In general,
water privatization proponents outspent opponents twelve to one from 1996-2002 (Hobbs
2003).
Interestingly, in 2002, Senate Bill 1961, or the Water Investment Act, passed
without anticipated provisions that would have required cities seeking federal funding for
upgrades to their water supply system to formally consider privatization as an option.
This provision of the bill was stripped due to pressure from various groups, including the
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American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) (Hobbs
2003; AFSCME 2002). However, the fact that such provisions in the bill were considered
is worth noting.
Another important development was a change in the U.S. tax code in the mid1990’s. Before 1997, the U.S. tax code penalized cities by revoking their tax-exempt
status if they contracted with private corporations for any reason for more than five years.
Then, due to intense lobbying efforts by both private corporations and municipalities
facing budget shortfalls, this limit was extended to twenty years in 1997, opening up an
enormous new market (Hobbs 2003). It is likely that part of this lobbying effort was
driven by projections of how much it will cost to replace and upgrade the nation’s
degrading water in6astructure in coming years. According to the National Research
Council (2002:3), the American Water Works Association estimated:
that the necessary investments in replacement of the nation’s water
infi'astructure to be $250 billion over the next 30 years.. .Public officials
with limited financial and technical resources are interested in alternatives
that may help meet these needs.
Clearly, water privatization is an emerging and significant issue for U.S.
municipalities and citizens. TNCs have bought out most of the American-owned
companies that deal with water management, and these TNCs are actively courting
favorable changes in legislation along with new contracts with U.S. municipalities.
Clarke and Barlow (2003) contend that these TNCs aim to control 70 percent o f U.S.
water utilities by 2010. Again, this “control” will likely occur in the form of private
management, not ownership. Similarly, Marsden (2003) predicts that 65-70 percent of
U.S. water systems will be privatized through public-private partnerships by 2015. The

19
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

potential for such rapid entry o f TNCs into the U.S. water market makes the present
research particularly timely.

Public-Private Partnerships in the U.S.
Since 1997, when changes in the U.S. tax code enabled U.S. municipalities to
negotiate public-private partnership contracts for up to twenty years, a series of water
supply partnerships have been created. These include contracts in places such as Atlanta,
GA, Stockton, CA, and Indianapolis, IN, and the partnerships have seen varying success
and failure. The Atlanta contract was cancelled four years after it was signed (Public
Citizen 2003d). Moreover, there was a significant public outcry in Stockton over issues
of public participation in the decision-making process to sign the contract (Public Citizen
2003e). The Stockton contract remains in effect, however, even though ongoing legal
battles threaten its long-term viability (Public Citizen 2004).

Analyzing the Dynamics of U.S. Partnerships
With the inception o f these contracts, analysis of the dynamics of these
partnerships and recommendations for their success has ensued. For example, Gleick et
al. (2002) developed a set of “Principles and Standards” for water privatization. These
include: 1) continuing to manage water as a social good, or ensuring that “all residents in
a service area should be guaranteed a basic water quantity,” 2) providing the necessary
oversight and management functions to effectively oversee the contract, 3) building water
conservation measures into the contract, 4) including “explicit performance criteria and
standards” in the contract to ensure transparency and accountability by both partners and.
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perhaps most importantly to this study, 5) ensuring that negotiations are “open,
transparent, and include all affected stakeholders” (Gleick et al. 2002:40-42). Thus, they
argue that the private sector can effectively contribute to water supply management, but
only ^local stakeholders are actively involved in deciding how this is to occur. They
contend.
Numerous political and financial problems for water customers and
private companies have resulted from arrangements that were perceived as
corrupt or not in the best interests of the public. Stakeholder participation
is widely recognized as the best way of avoiding these problems. Broad
participation by affected parties ensures that diverse values and varying
viewpoints are articulated and incorporated into the process (Gleick et al.
2002: 42),
More specifically, they provide examples of initiatives cities can undertake to effectively
involve “stakeholders” or key players, including,
the creation of public advisory committees with broad community
representation to advise governments proposing privatization; formal
public review of contracts in advance o f signing agreements; and public
education efforts in advance of any transfer of public responsibilities to
private companies (Gleick et al. 2002: 42).
Examples such as these provide cities with important options for how Üiey can involve
the public in the negotiating process. However, Gleick et al. (2002) do not provide any
on-the-ground evidence or case studies demonstrating how these public participation
initiatives have operated in specific public-private partnerships. Furthermore, what sorts
of issues would a “public advisory committee” or a “formal public review” bring to bear
on a partnership? What are key players truly concerned about? Making the
recommendation is one thing; providing evidence for how they have operated in an actual
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place is another. Through an in-depth look at Indianapolis’ experiences, the present study
begins to fill in these gaps.
Additionally, the National Research Council (NRG) conducted a comprehensive
review of key issues in U.S. water privatization, including the evaluation of “fiscal,
policy, management, regulatoiy, water quality, and environmental issues” (NRG 2002:
viii). Some o f their key findings include: 1) the acknowledgement that “pressure from
large national and global water companies has motivated improved performance by
public water utilities,” 2) “privatization is not the same as competition,” 3) small to
medium-sized utilities are the best candidates for involving the private sector in their
operations, 4) customers are vdlling to pay more for higher quality water, 5) workforce
issues need to be seriously considered, “both as a possible source of cost savings and a
focal point for public concern” and, 6) the majority of water utilities will most likely
continue to be publicly owned (NRG 2002: 7-8).
There is some discrepancy, therefore, between various evaluations of how
widespread these public-participation contracts will become in the future. As mentioned
above, Marsden (2003) and Glarke and Barlow (2003) predicted that 65-70 percent of
U.S. water utilities could be operating with a public-private partnership by 2015. The
NRG (2002), on the other hand, believes that the pressure from these TNGs may
effectively improve the performance of public water utilities to the point where involving
the private sector is not needed anymore. TNGs have only been involved in the U.S.
water industry for the past seven years and their contracts have seen mixed results.
Although there are mixed projections on far widespread their reach will become, cities
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considering these partnerships will most likely be keeping a close watch on those
partnerships that already exist.
The National Council on Public-Private Partnerships (NCPPP), a non-profit
orgamzation that promotes partnerships of all kinds (not just for water supplies), has even
produced a series o f short profiles of "successful" partnerships (see www.ncppp.org).
Given the perspective o f the organization, these case studies have to be viewed critically;
however, they do suggest that interested organizations are making the effort to promote
public-private partnerships by example. Indeed, the NCPPP even awarded Indianapolis
with its “Public-Private Partnership Award” in the service category in November 2004,
indicating that Indianapolis is viewed as a successful model for these partnerships
(Indianapolis Water 2005). In this vein, one of my goals for this study is to hold a mirror
up to a specific public-private partnership through a case-study approach, remaining open
to new ideas and perspectives that emerge from interviews with key players.
The NRC also addresses the issue o f involving the public in these public-private
partnerships. They cite a British water publication as saying, “Future development will be
governed by creative solutions involving true partnerships of all stakeholders in the
sector, taking account o f local political and social sensibilities” (Owen 2001 in NRC
2002: 23). In addition, they caution that, “Communities may also have concerns
regarding long-term protection of watersheds that convey raw water supplies,
participation in and transparency o f policy decisions, and competition after service
contracts are awarded” (italics added; NRC 2002: 25). Lastly, the NRC (2002:103)
advises that, “Strategies for improving water utility performance must be implemented
within a local political environment shaped by the values and interests o f the community
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and elected officials.” Thus, the NRC acknowledges the importance of involving the
community in any negotiations for a public-private partnership, especially since each
commumty is diffirent and will be concerned about a variety of issues. They suggest that
the workforce, watershed conservation, and contract monitoring are issues of public
concern. Again, like Gleick et al. (2002), the NRC does not provide any specific evidence
to support this. These concerns make sense, yet perhaps there are others that have not
been discovered or some are more relevant than others under certain circumstances.
Conducting a more thoroi^h investigation o f one community, Indianapolis, will begin to
ground these concerns in a real place, while also perhaps suggesting some new issues that
need to be addressed.

Theoretical Foundations
Before getting to the findings in Indianapolis, however, it is also important to
acknowledge and briefly discuss the larger theoretical foundations that issues surrounding
privatization and public participation are grounded in. There are various theories that
both promote and critique privatization, citing both the benefits and downfalls of what
has become a very popular policy alternative. Likewise, public participation has a rich
theoretical background that can be applied in a myriad of public arenas. Since these
theories stem from decades o f experience, familiarity with their general frameworks is
important. Then, when investigating the details o f water privatization and public
participation in Indianapolis, these frameworks can provide general criteria to look for as
the perspectives of the key players emerge.
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Privatization
History, First, the term “privatization” is often murky and ambiguous by itself.
Without a context, it is relatively meaningless, besides denoting some involvement of the
private sector. Indeed, Donahue (1989: 5-6) argues.
Privatization is not only an inelegant term; it is lamentably imprecise. The
word can signify something as broad as shrinking the welfare state while
promoting self-help and voluntarism, or something as narrow as
substituting a team o f private workers for an all-but-identical team o f civil
servants to carry out a particular task.
With that said, however, privatization in one form or another has been in existence for a
long time. Moreover, it has recently gained more momentum with the rise o f neo
liberalism, and a focus on free markets and reducing the role of government in providing
goods and services, as noted above (Savas 2000). Therefore, it is important to discuss
why and when privatization first became a viable policy alternative in its current form.
According to Greene (2002), at least on the local level, privatization gained its recent
prominence in the 1970’s when the U.S. energy crisis caused widespread fiscal stress.
This stress led to a decrease in municipal revenues and an increase in “welfare” spending,
causing widespread flight of the middle class and the growth of the suburbs. Various
industries also became more mobile in search of municipalities with the lowest taxes.
Then, in the 1980’s, under the Reagan Administration, there was an emphasis on “new
federalism.” This new federalism deferred to market forces and promoted the financing
o f local programs and projects at the state or local level, not through federal funding.
Similarly, Savas (2000; 15) argues that “privatization was first suggested in 1969
by... Professor Peter Drucker,” and the administrations of Margaret Thatcher and Ronald
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Reagan “gave high visibility and a pronounced ideological impetus to what became the
privatization movement.”
The combination o f fiscal stress and increased responsibility for funding sources
led mumcipalities to seek out alternative sources of capital. The private sector was one
such source, and municipalities increasingly turned to privatization as a way to manage
and fund services that were traditionally “public” in nature. Of course, the exact type of
privatization is dependent on the specific example.
The theoretical foundations for privatization can, in their simplest form, be
divided into those that promote privatization and those that do not. This debate is
centered on the question of “whether privatization can actually deliver public services
more economically than traditional government auspices” (Greene 2002: 5). Thus, below
I give a general outline o f the theories that fall on these two “sides” while also
recognizing that in reality much discourse actually falls more in the middle.

Privatization proponents. Perhaps the most often heard and important argument
for privatization is that of efficiency. Government is large and slow, a monopoly with no
incentive for cutting costs. The private sector is competitive, flexible, and economical.
Thus, including private corporations in the implementation of public policy goals will
result in lower costs to the public and increased flexibility, especially for short-term
projects (e.g. street cleaning or specific construction jobs). Furthermore, through the use
of public-private partnerships, risks can be shared with the private sector, and economies
o f scale can be utilized. Also, if results are unsatisfactory, a municipality can simply
contract with another firm (Greene 2002).
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This argument is built on both market and public choice theory. Market theory is
“based on [an] idealized model in which firms seek to maximize profits, are small
relative to their industries, and where no restrictions exist to prevent firms from entering
or exiting an industry” (Greene 2002: 13). Competition for contracts will help expose the
true costs of production and the removal of politics from decision-making will result in
better management. Moreover, there is an assumption of well-informed consumers (who
have perfect information) who have distinctly defined their preferences for alternative
goods (called preference orderings) (Greene 2002).
Public choice theory, on the other hand, is loosely based on rational choice theory
which states that humans are rational actors that seek to maximize their self-interest (this
stands in contrast to collective action theory which states that humans often make choices
based on reciprocity and trust and what is good for a larger community or group; see
Ostrum 1998). In relation to privatization, public choice theory posits that public
managers will make decisions based on their own self-interest rather than the interest of
the larger public. Furthermore, if services are subsidized, making costs lower, citizens
will demand too many services, creating a “bloated” government (Greene 2002). This
explains why government is perceived to be so inefficient; government is a monopoly
with no incentives for efficiency. Thus, separating financing from the production of
public services (as through a public-private partnership) combats this perceived
inefficiency.
Both of these theories clearly have weaknesses, especially when related to realworld situations and problems. For instance, many of the corporations that operate in
public-private partnerships with public utilities are not “small relative to their industries.”
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Often, they are large national or transnational corporations who only have a few
competitors. Also, contract length and the complexity of what is privatized may create
restrictions on ease of entry and exit out of the “market.” With public choice theory, there
is ample empirical evidence that challenges the idea that humans always make decisions
exclusively in their self-interest (Ostrum 1998). Both o f these theories have been
instrumental in providing the foundation for privatization proponents, however, and can
be easily recognized in the discourse that surrounds this issue.

Critics o f privatization. Instead of focusing on efficiency, critics of privatization
concentrate on issues of equity and public accountability. They argue that efficiency is
not the only priority of government and that the task of governing will be compromised
with the inclusion o f the private sector. In addition, they argue that there is often
inadequate competition for public-private partnerships, corruption is a common problem,
and there is a decided loss of accountability when private corporations are in charge. It is
much “more difficult for the public to hold contractors responsible than elected officials
or bureaucrats when there are problems with service” (Greene 2002: 17). This is often
termed “sector blurring” whereby the mixing of public and private responsibilities results
in a blurring of who is accountable, and can lead to corruption and a loss of public
employment. Finally, opponents firmly believe, in contrast to proponents, that
government services should be determined in a political context, not solely in the
marketplace. Thus, politics are an important and legitimate variable to consider in
decision-making (Greene 2002).
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These arguments are based in market failure theory. This theory emphasizes
market imperfections such as: 1) the existence of externalities such as pollution, 2) the
reality o f natural monopolies such as utilities and, 3) that large capital investments are
often necessary to move between industries. Additionally, it stresses the existence of
“imperfect information” or that consumers often make choices with inadequate
information about products, and that the “true cost of production” is often obscured when
corporations purposely bid low for contracts with the assumption that they will recoup
their losses in the future (Greene 2002).
In general, privatization critics do not believe that privatization can never work or
should never be utilized. Rather, they emphasize that efficiency must be balanced with
other concerns of accountability and equity, and privatization contracts should be entered
into cautiously and carefully, acknowledging the potential pitfalls that may occur.
In summary, efficiency, the removal o f politics, and competition are the primary
benefits touted by privatization supporters. In contrast, critics express concerns about
equity, public accountability, externalities, utilities as natural monopolies, and the lack of
competition. All of these claims are good to keep in mind when investigating the realities
of Indianapolis and the experiences of key players there.

Public Participation
Public participation, likewise, has a rich and varied past. It is a complex subject
with numerous theoretical foundations and historical precedents. In the following section,
I outline a few key issues brought up in recent literature that are especially relevant to this
study. This, again, provides some context for the issues raised by the participants in this
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study, tying their comments and beliefs to a larger framework, while also allowing for the
emergence of new issues around this topic. The key issues addressed below include more
clearly defining the “public” and “public participation,” evaluating avenues for
participation, the timing o f the participation, and the authenticity o f the participation as
viewed by the participants.

D efining **public. ” First, the term “public” itself is an ambiguous term. Who
exactly is the public? Roberts (1995:227) approaches this question by describing the
“public” as:
a constantly shifting multiplicity of affiliations and alliances that group
and regroup according to the issues,... their understanding o f the
issues.. .[and] perceptions o f risk.. There is no single ‘public’; instead
there are a number of publics, some of whom emerge at any time during
the process depending on their particular concerns and the issues involved.
Thus, public officials, or those charged with managing a public participation process,
must be sensitive to a variety of “publics” rather than homogenizing everyone into one
group. They also must realize that some groups may be more concerned with various
aspects of the decision than others, along with various aspects of the decision-making
process itself. Therefore, the main goal should be to ensure that “everyone is entitled to
the opportunity to participate and, even for those who do not participate, that their
interests are protected” (Roberts 1995: 227).

Public consultation and participation. Next, Roberts (1995) makes an important
distinction between consulting the public and actually having them participate, both of
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which fall under the heading of “public involvement” He makes this distinction by
saying.
While consultation includes education, information sharing, and
negotiation, the goal being better decision making by the organization
consulting the public, participation actually brings the public into the
decision-making process. Typically, public involvement has focused
primarily on consulting the public, with no options for greater
involvement (italics in original; Roberts 1995: 224).
This distinction is useful because it seems likely that people’s expectations for what is
typically called “public participation” may differ considerably depending on whether they
simply want to be informed and educated (or consulted) as compared to actually having a
place at the table during the decision-making process. Furthermore, could this potential
difference in expectations be a source of conflict? While I may not be able to answer that
question with this study, identifying the expectations of key players in Indianapolis may
prove important in interpreting their views on public participation in this case. Also, I
will continue to use the more conventional term “public participation” although, as it is
defined by Roberts (1995), some of the examples in Indianapolis may be more
appropriately called “public consultation.”

Avenues fo r participation. The next question, then, is: how can the public
participate? Webler and Renn (1995) cite numerous avenues, including involvement in
political parties, litigation, attendance at public meetings or hearings, voting, public
workshops, submitting written comments to public agencies, appointments to citizen
advisory committees (also called citizen advisory groups or CAGs), study circles, public
protest, and citizen panels. This list encompasses both public consultation and
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participation strategies. Three o f these strategies - public hearings, litigation, and
advisory groups —are or have been utilized in Indianapolis. Furthermore, each of these
avenues can be analyzed independently for their strengths, weaknesses, benefits and
downfalls.

Public hearings. Webler and Renn (1995), for instance, briefly analyze the public
hearing. They characterize this participation opportunity as disempowering to citizens,
“often held late in the process when public impact can be.. .minimal,” ineffective at
allowing more than a small number of people to speak, and “held primarily to satisfy
legal requirements, rather than really promote public input” (Webler and Renn 1995: 24).
In contrast, Chess and Purcell (1999:2686) cite both strengths and weaknesses of public
meetings, arguing that although critics have raised concerns that public meetings only
serve to “legitimize agency decisions that have already been made,” some empirical
research has provided a “more optimistic assessment.”

Citizen advisory committees. Van (1995), on the other hand, evaluates citizen
advisory committees (CACs). According to her analysis, CACs are often unable to define
their own agenda, rather having to accept the agenda and issues deemed important by the
organization or private company they are advising. Also, the general public only has
limited opportunity to influence the discourse of the CAC, and CAC members often have
to spend a considerable amount of time being educated about the issues before they can
discuss them. Lynn and Kartez (1995:88), on the other hand, describe some benefits of
CACs:
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they inform public agencies about broad community attitudes; they
educate citizens about proposed institutional actions; they increase
ultimate acceptance of those decisions; and they allow government and
industry to deal with one relatively small body o f citizens rather than the
entire community.

Lynn and Kartez also indicate, however, that there is substantial variation in how open
CACs are to the general public. CACs may work closely with the community they
represent or in relative isolation. Furthermore, the C A C s ability to conduct public
outreach and education about its efforts is limited by the resources and money provided
by the sponsoring institution.
In addition, Lynn and Kartez address the development of industry-established
CACs. They argue that industry CACs have faced many of the same "fairness and
competence issues” experienced by government-sponsored CACs, including
responsibility for agenda-setting, determination of decision-making procedures, and the
ability of members to develop a group mission and identity. Finally, they conclude that
the impact of the CAC is dependent on the "intentions” o f the sponsoring institution. If
the government or industry has no intention o f following the recommendations of the
CAC, it is impossible for the CAC to have any "meaningful” influence (Lynn and Kartez
1995; 98).
The formation of public-private partnerships provides a different setting for
CACs. In the case of Indianapolis, the CAC (called a Citizens Advisory Group, or CAO,
there) advises the private partner but was established by the partnership. Their yearly
evaluation is also tied to a percentage of Veolia’s incentive payments. How the IWC
CAO was established, the makeup of its members, difficulties with adequate outreach

33
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

about its meetings, and responsibility for agenda setting are some of the issues addressed
in the findings in Chapter Five.

Timing. Subsequently, the timing of these various participation opportunities is
another key issue to consider. Webler and Renn (1995) cite Langton (1978) as defining a
current condition called the “participation paradox.” Part of this paradox is that
participation can be a form of therapy, in that citizens are often only asked to participate
after a decision has been made. This leads to feelings of frustration and being cheated out
of the process. Similarly, Chess and Purcell (1999), outline five suggestions for
successful public participation that empirical research supports. One of these is to;
begin participation early and invest in advance planning.. .Timing of the
participation effort., .was cited in cases in which participants were placed
in a reactive position by virtue o f being asked to consider agency
proposals - often perceived as final decisions - rather than to join in earlier
discussions o f alternatives. Conversely, early involvement was positively
noted by other studies. (Chess and Purcell 1999: 2691)
King, Felty, and Susel (1998: 3) similarly note that citizen participation can be more
“symbolic than real... [when] it happens too late in the process, that is, after the issues
have been firamed and most decisions have been made.”

**Authentic’*participation. Finally, the “authenticity” o f the participation is
another significant issue. In short, providing opportunity for public input is one thing.
Actually taking that input seriously, and incorporating it into a decision, is another. King
et al. (1998:3) define “authentic participation” as “deep and continuous involvement in
administrative processes with the potential for all involved to have an effect on the
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situation.” Or, put another way, for participation to be “authentic,” those participating
must feel like their input is important and actually being considered by decision-makers.
It requires “focus, commitment, trust, and open and honest discussion” along with
placing equal emphasis on both process and outcome (King et al. 1998:4). Actually
devising criteria for authentic participation is challenging, but King et al. provide a useful
summary of its key characteristics, along with practical advice on how to overcome
existing barriers. These include educating administrators on meeting facilitation skills,
conducting public education programs that inform citizens how they can participate,
holding meetings at convenient locations and times for the community (including
providing child care and/or food), and diversifying the format of meetings, among others.
The idea o f “authentic” participation echoes Lynn and Kartez’s (1995) discussion of
CACs and whether they have “meaningful” influence on their sponsoring institution.
Furthermore, I use the idea of “authentic” participation to frame my central research
question for this study.
In summary, some o f the key issues in public participation include how the public
and participation are defined, evaluation of specific avenues for participation such as the
public hearing and CACs, and the timing and authenticity of participation. For the
purposes of this study, I define the “public” broadly, including ratepayers, taxpayers,
citizen groups, and employees of the IWC. Occasionally, I separate out the employees
when describing issues specific to them. I also define “participation” broadly, including
consultation and actual participation. In Indianapolis, this includes public hearings,
advisory groups, and litigation. To conclude this chapter, then, I will address the
intersection of privatization and public participation in the literature.
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Water Privatization and Public Participation Considered Together
There is a limited literature that explicitly considers privatization and public
participation together. In one example. Hall and Goudriaan (1999:3) contend that “under
privatization.. .institutions of local democracy are severely weakened.” They couple this
assertion, though, with the point that successful resistance to privatization occurs through
the use of local democratic institutions. This suggests an interesting balance between the
weakening of democratic institutions and the use of those same undermined institutions
to try to regain some of their strength. They cite three “key elements in the privatization
process which affect local democracy: 1) the multinationals and their political
connections, 2) the range o f pressures brought to bear against local authorities, and 3) the
loss of public accountability that follows privatization” (Hall and Goudriaan 199:3). The
recent takeovers o f American-owned water corporations by TNCs and changes in U.S.
legislation support the first point. Hobbs’ (2003) research on U.S. municipalities and the
public relations campaigns directed towards local officials by the water industry provides
support for the second point. Finally, Hall and Goudriaan provide evidence of a
“democratic backlash” against privatization, especially in the form of election results. In
many locales, privatization has been made an election issue, and the party favoring
privatization has often lost as a result. Furthermore, trade unions have been key players in
these campaigns, favoring the retention of services in the public domain. Unfortunately,
almost all o f the examples they cite are not in the U.S., with the exception of a town in
Long Island, New York that “re-municipalized” their electric utility.
The development o f “Principles and Standards” for water privatization by Gleick
et al. (2002), along with the general analysis offered by the National Research Council
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(2002), both described above, also provide some useful signposts and key issues that may
occur when water privatization and public participation intersect, albeit without any
grounding in real-world examples. The absence o f any case studies that investigate in
detail how exactly water privatization and public participation intersect in a specific place
is intriguing, and begs for further research. How do we know if these suggestions, advice,
principles, and standards are applicable and relevant to the messy, complicated, political
realities U.S. cities are facing? Do the arguments of privatization supporters and
opponents hold up in the case of water? Are the various concerns raised about public
participation relevant to this situation, where the public is “participating” with both
public and private entities? Or are new issues developing?
Water is a necessary component of all of our lives, every single day. It has a
strong history as a public resource (even if it is managed by a private company, public
regulators retain a huge responsibility for ensuring the water’s safety). Will the public
retain its right to participate in decisions about their water if the water is managed by a
transnational corporation? Are new avenues for participation developing to accommodate
this new dynamic? Or do people even care?
Each and every U.S. water system is unique, with its own set of ecological,
political, economic, and social circumstances. Municipalities organize themselves and
their water utilities through a vast array of mechanisms, laws, and regulations, all of
which also contribute to their distinctive situation. Nevertheless, there are similarities too.
This is why cities often look to each other as examples, networking and learning from
each other about their common circumstances. Thus, as cities look to the future, and
recognize that keeping their water utility in good working order may cost a substantial
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amount of money, they might benefit from knowing what other cities have experienced
and the solutions they have tried.
In conclusion, this study is about the intersection of water privatization and public
participation in the U.S. The main goals are two-fold: 1) to investigate the details of how
the Indianapolis Water Company is now publicly owned and privately managed in
Indianapolis, IN and, 2) how the public fits in to this new dynamic. With the intersection
of water privatization and public participation, there are many general guidelines but only
a limited amount o f evidence based on actual experience to back them up. Thus, this
study aims to contribute towards bridging that divide. The circumstances in Indianapolis
are certainly unique to that place. By interviewing key players in the Indianapolis water
supply partnership, however, I hope to more thoroughly describe the private management
of water there and the role of the public in these new circumstances. This place-specific
information will hopefully serve to “grotmd” the existing theory, or at least a small part
o f it, while perhaps also raising or emphasizing new issues that have not been thoroughly
considered yet.
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CHAPTER THREE
THE RESEARCH APPROACH; BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY

Undertaking the task of researching the intersection of water privatization and
public participation in Indianapolis was a complex endeavor. How did I choose
Indianapolis in the first place? How did I select the participants in this study? What were
my data collection and analysis methods? And why are these methods valid? This chapter
answers these questions by outlining the methodology used to conduct this study. First, I
provide a brief background on Indianapolis, which is considerably expanded upon
throughout Chapters Four and Five. This gives the reader a basic understanding of
Indianapolis’s story and the sequence of events there. Then, the data collection methods
are described, including details on the participants, followed by an outline of the data
analysis techniques and its theoretical foundations. Finally, a brief discussion of the
validity of this methodology, including an acknowledgement of its limitations,
serves to justify my research approach.

Water for Sale in Indianapolis
The Indianapolis Water Company (IWC) has been in existence since 1880. Up
until 2002, it was a privately-owned water utility, with the exception of a few years in the
late 1800s when the City o f Indianapolis briefly took it over and then sold it back to
private investors. In the 1960s, it went public, issuing shares to stockholders that could be
traded on the stock exchange. Although it was privately owned, investors tended to be
locally-based in the Indianapolis area. In the 1980’s and 1990’s, due to inflationary
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pressures, the IWC bought other businesses to provide alternative sources of income (for
example, the Miller Pipeline Company), and by the mid-1990's more than half of their
revenue came from non-regulated (i.e. non-water supply) sources. Then, in 1997, the
IWC was sold to NiSource (the Northern Indiana Public Service Company), a regional
power and gas company, for a price of $288 million (Miller 2003). At this point, the IWC
was the largest privately-owned water utility in the United States that served a single city,
with over one million customers. Then, between 1997 and 2001, NiSource also acquired
the Columbia Gas Company, throwing itself over the federal threshold of the Holding
Company Act of 1936. This forced them to sell off some of their non-gas related assets,
including the IWC. Initially, they wanted to put the IWC on the open market, and this
may have led to an outright sale of the IWC to one of the transnational corporations
described in Chapter Two. However, the City of Indianapolis discovered they had first
right of refusal for the IWC (established back in the 1800s when the City briefly owned
the utility), and they decided to exercise this right. NiSource balked and brought the
claim to court, but the courts ruled the City was correct. Negotiations for the sale began.
As the negotiations proceeded, the employees of the IWC understandably became
concerned about their future. In response, Mayor Bart Peterson wrote them a public letter
stating that, regardless o f what the City decided to do with the utility, their pay and
benefits would remain protected. The City, who had essentially never owned or managed
the water utility, set up a Department of Waterworks in December 2001 to receive the
assets of the IWC. This was governed by a bi-partisan Board of Waterworks appointed by
the Mayor. They also had to decide what they were going to do with the IWC once they
owned it. They essentially had three options: 1) run the IWC as a City department, as

40
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

many utilities are throughout the U.S., 2) put the IWC under the existing Citizens Gas &
Coke Utility (the local gas company), which is managed by a non-partisan public trust
that does not report to the City government, or 3) contract the operation and management
of tiie IWC to a private partner. They chose the public-private partnership model and
began issuing a Request for Qualifications and a Request for Proposals in December
2001 (how they decided this and the decision-making process they went through is a
source of debate and controversy and is discussed further in Chapter Four). Also, by this
time the City and NiSource had agreed upon a deadline of April 30, 2002 for the
transaction (a continuing source o f debate as well).
Thus, between December 2001 and the end of April 2002, the City of Indianapolis
requested and received proposals for the partnership, evaluated the proposals, chose a set
of top candidates, made a final recommendation to the Board of Waterworks and the
City-County Council, conducted final negotiations, and drew up a public-private
partnership contract. They chose USFilter, a subsidiary o f the TNC Vivendi
Environment. On April 30, 2002, the City o f Indianapolis bought the IWC from NiSource
for $515 million (almost double the price NiSource paid five years prior), and the next
day. May 1, 2002, USFilter officially took over all operations and management of the
utility (Miller 2003). The contract’s length is twenty years, and is unique in that it is
incentive-based. This means that 25% of USFilter’s annual fee is based on performancebased incentives. If they do not meet the established performance criteria, they do not
receive their money. Since then, for the past three years, USFilter (now called Veolia
after Vivendi sold off some of USFilter’s assets) has operated and managed the IWC,
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with the oversight and partnership of the Board o f Waterworks and a series o f advisory
groups.
Perhaps the most controversial occurrence during the first three years of the
partnership has been litigation filed against the City. The first was a class-action lawsuit
filed on behalf of the employees of the IWC for lost benefits since Veolia has become
their employer. This relates directly to the letter Mayor Peterson sent the employees and
retirees in 2001 when the City decided to buy the IWC that promised full protection of
the employee’s benefit packages. In August 2004, however, the courts ruled in the City’s
favor on all but one count. The second lawsuit relates to the legality of the City’s decision
to create the partnership. This lawsuit claims that the City was legally bound to place the
IWC under the same public trust the Gas Company currently operates under. In
September 2004, the courts again ruled in favor of the City, but the plaintiffs’ are
currently trying to get the case re-tried in another jurisdiction.
This is the basic story o f the Indianapolis Water Company and its recent transition
to public ownership and private management by a TNC. What this story does not include
is how the partnership is faring (beyond the lawsuits) and how the public has been
involved throughout the entire process. These topics are anything but straightforward,
and constitute the bulk o f the findings in Chapters Four and Five (although a few parts of
the story outlined above are also open to interpretation, as noted).
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Assembling the Parts
Choosing Indianapolis
When I first proposed this research, I hoped to study a set of U.S. cities that had
formed public-private partnerships to manage their water utilities. These included
Stockton, CA, New Orleans, LA, and Indianapolis, IN. After realizing the gargantuan
nature of such an undertaking (stemming from the wise advice of my committee), I
decided to scale back the research to just one city. I chose Indianapolis out of the three
cities originally proposed for a few re^ons.
Foremost, Indianapolis is a relatively new contract that has received a minimal
amount o f scrutiny. Stockton, CA, on the other hand, had a documentary called “Thirst”
made in part about its water privatization contract (see www.thirstthemovie.org for more
information on the film). It also received a significant amount of media attention due to a
series of lawsuits revolving around public participation in the decision-making process
there. Thus, many of the key players in Stockton have been interviewed by various
people, and the dynamics of that partnership is already better understood than those of
other cities. New Orleans, in contrast, ended up voting against a partnership, thus limiting
the depth o f my research to the decision-making process and no further.
Second, there were logistical reasons that made Indianapolis a more valid choice.
I had personal acquaintances in Indianapolis that assisted with contacting some of my
participants, and could provide lodging during a visit. I have also been to Indianapolis
before, unlike the other cities, making it easier for me to find my way around during
interview appointments. While these may be minor advantages, they felt sigmflcant at the
time of the decision, and ended up making the data collection a very smooth process.
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Finally, given that the Indianapolis Water Company was the largest privatelyowned water utility serving a single city in the U.S., and many other cities are likely
going to be keeping a watchful eye on the progression of the partnership there, I thought
it would be useful to study a high-profile example.

The Case Study Approach
The research for this study was qualitative in nature, and involved a case-study
approach. Case studies can involve a variety o f data-gathering techniques, including indepth interviews, document collection, participant observation, and site visits and are
useful in that they provide “extremely rich, detailed, and in-depth information” about a
person, community, organization, or situation (Berg 2001: 225). Hence, I primarily used
two data collection techniques to research the intersection of water privatization and
public participation in Indianapolis: 1) in-depth, semi-structured interviews, and 2)
document collection. These are addressed separately in the next sections.

Interviews
The semi-structured interview involves scheduled questions that each participant
is asked, but leaves room for the interviewer to probe deeper with unscheduled questions
depending on the answers they are hearing (Berg 2001). Using this interview structure
allowed me to “approach the world from the subject’s perspective” (Berg 2001:70), and it
gave the participants the freedom to express their opinions in their own words, something
that is not captured with conventional quantitative survey methods (see Appendix A for
the interview guide). This interview structure provides a useful balance between asking
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questions consistently o f all of the participants and providing an opportunity for
elaboration based on the participant’s area of expertise and depth of knowledge about
certain subjects.
I located and selected participants through a variety of methods. Initially, I
conducted a basic search on the internet for information on the Indianapolis partnership.
This led me to a few names, phone numbers, and email addresses of people that seemed
to be involved with the partnership, or at least had a strong interest in it. Ultimately, I was
looking for “key players” in the partnership, or what are often called “stakeholders.”
However, it could be argued that all o f the customers of the IWC are stakeholders, so I
needed to narrow down the field in some way. The NRC (2002:101) characterizes
stakeholders in this situation as “governments, employees and labor unions, citizentaxpayers, customer-ratepayers, and local groups representing business, consumer, and
environmental interests.” Thus, I aimed to interview people who fell into each of these
categories, accessing a broad spectrum of perspectives.
I contacted the people I located on the internet, asking them for more information
on how they are or were involved, whether they would be willing to participate in the
study, and if they knew of anyone else that I should contact. This last part proved crucial
in assembling a set o f participants because it allowed me to establish a connection with
people after “cold-calling” them (or cold-emailing them) by mentioning the name of
someone they knew. This sampling technique is called “snowball” sampling because it
“snowballs fi’om a few subjects to many subjects” (Berg 2001:33). My initial contacts
were very generous with names and enthusiastic about participating in the study. They
even gave me the names and contact information for people who, by their judgment, had
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very different opinions on the partnership. This gave me some confidence that my sample
would provide a diverse set of perspectives. At some point, I started to reach a level of
saturation with the names people were giving me, or the people they suggested were only
peripherally related to the partnership.
In total, I contacted sixteen people to interview, and all of them accepted the
invitation. Nobody declined my interview request. One additional participant was added
when a scheduled participant decided to bring them to the interview without my prior
knowledge (although they provided a useful perspective as well), leading to a total of
seventeen participants. Sixteen of these participants are men, and one is a woman. I
classified the participants into six categories;
1) Public officials
• Three participants
• One current City-County Council member
• A former City-County Council member who is a member of the Board of
Waterworks and its former Chair
• The Director of the GasAVater/Sewer Division of tiie Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission
2) City and Veolia employees that oversee the contract
• Two participants
• The City employee was a consultant during the decision-making process
• The Veolia employee has worked for Veolia world-wide for ten years
3) Advisory group members
• Three participants
• One Citizens Advisory Group member
• Two Technical Advisory Group members
4) Citizen/environmental activists
• Three participants
• The Executive Director o f the Hoosier Environmental Council (HEC)
• One Board Member o f HEC who is also the Program Director for the
group Protect Our Rivers Now
• One Board Member o f HEC who is also the Director o f the Indiana
Alliance for Democracy
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5) Current and former employees o f the IWC, including members of the union
• Five participants
• The President and the Business Manager of the largest union at the IWC
• A non-umon IWC manager who was the lead plaintiff in a lawsuit filed
against the City regarding lost benefits
• The former President of the IWC who retired when it was sold to the City
• A former IWC executive who also served on the Board of Waterworks
6) A lawyer handling a series of lawsuits that have been filed against the City
(discussed more below)
• One participant
In a few cases, there was some overlap in the categories (see Appendix B for an
expanded summary o f the participants). For the most part, then, I was able to include a
broad spectrum of “stakeholders,” as described by the National Research Council above.
I did not interview a general “customer-ratepayer” because I only wanted to include
people who had a significant amount of knowledge about the partnership or some facet of
it. The majority of my participants, however, were ratepayers too. Finally, the various
backgrounds of the study participants impacted the amount of knowledge they had on
certain subjects. Thus, some participants never spoke on some subjects and commented in
abundance on others. This is reflected in the presentation of the findings.
I conducted fourteen of the interviews in person over a period of four days in
Indianapolis in August 2004.1 conducted the remaining three interviews over die phone
after I returned home. Interviews ranged in length from forty minutes to an hour and a
half. They took place in a variety of locations around Indianapolis, including personal
homes, business offices, and restaurants. All were recorded, although the majority of one
was accidentally taped over. For that interview, I took detailed notes as soon as possible
after the mistake was realized (on the same day), and the last ten minutes of the interview
were preserved on tape. With the exception of one interview, all of the interviews were
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one on one. In one instance, I interviewed two people at the same time (see Appendix B).
I asked all of the participants whether they wanted their identity kept confidential in this
paper and any subsequent reports, and all of them declined. Therefore, I use the real
names of participants throughout Chapters Four and Five.

Document Collection
During my travels to Indianapolis, I also collected a set o f documents related to
the partnership. These were primarily collected by asking the study participants if they
had any documents they thought were relevant, although on a few occasions they brought
these along without any prompting from me. The documents I collected include local
newspaper articles about the partnership, internal memos, emails, and letters, and the
Assets Purchase Agreement between the City and NiSource. At the time, I was not
entirely clear about whether these documents would prove useful in my analysis;
however, I felt compelled to take advantage of being in Indianapolis and the availability
of the documents.
I also collected a set of documents that are available on-line. They include the
Management Agreement between the City of Indianapolis and Veolia (previously called
USFilter) and meeting agendas and minutes for the Board of Waterworks, Technical
Advisory Group, and Citizens Advisory Group. Again, at the time, I was simply trying to
collect as much information as possible about the partnership without a clear idea of
whether these documents would be helpful in the end.
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M aking Sense of it All
After conducting all o f the interviews, they were transcribed verbatim. 1
transcribed twelve o f the sixteen interviews myself, and paid someone to do the
remaining four. I also double-checked and made corrections on those four transcripts to
ensure their integrity.
Then, I commenced content analysis using an inductive approach. Content
analysis is generally described as condensing written text into an “objective coding
scheme” as a way to make the text “systematically comparable” (Berg 2001: 238). An
inductive approach “begins with the researchers ‘immersing’ themselves in the
documents (that is, the various messages) in order to identify the dimensions or themes
that seem meaningful to the producers o f each message” (italics in original; Abrahamson
1983 in Berg 2001:245). These themes are then turned into specific categories that are
“grounded” in the data from which they came. These emergent categories, therefore,
were derived from the interview texts themselves instead of established beforehand. This
is often called “open coding” (Berg 2001). Furthermore, my analysis was interpretive in
nature because I placed emphasis on context (through discussion of people’s personal
experiences), and sought to understand people’s own definitions of their social reality
(Neuman 2000).
To complete the content analysis, I first read through half of the interview
transcripts and made initial lists of categories and topics that emerged from the data, but
without actually marking anything on the transcripts themselves. Some of these
categories were understandably driven by the questions I asked. For instance, one of my
questions was: “Why do you think the City decided to contract with a private company to
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manage the water company?” The participants gave a variety of answers, including things
such as the city wanted more control or it was driven by politics. Thus, while one of my
main categories was about why the city decided to create the partnership, all of the
reasons emerged from the interviews themselves.
After completing this initial “pre-coding,” I went through all of the transcripts in
detail and open coded them. I wrote the codes on the transcripts themselves and then, at
the end o f each interview, organized the codes for that person into a spreadsheet-like
format (although I did it by hand, not on a computer). This allowed me to easily compare
the participants and their perspectives, and to perform some simple quantitative
calculations, such as the frequencies of various codes, at the end of the analysis.
Throughout the coding process, I frequently went through my growing lists of
categories (and sub-categories, etc.) to identify any overlapping categories, or possibly
move them around. At the end, I revised some of the codes in the transcripts themselves
and on the spreadsheets. All of this coding and spreadsheet organization served as a way
to organize a very complex text, allowed me to calculate relative frequencies, as noted
above, and made it easy to find relevant quotes and perspectives on particular topics (all
codes were accompanied by a page number on the spreadsheet). Additionally, I want to
emphasize that my codes simply tried to capture an individual opinion or perspective of
the participant. Other types of coding are more in tune to the use of specific words or
phrases; however, I was more interested in coding ideas and themes, which involved
some interpretation on my part. Finally, in the findings and analysis presented in the next
two chapters, I give participant quotations verbatim, with some extraneous language (e.g.
“you know”) omitted. Deletions are represented with ellipses.
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The documents I collected are not cited in the text of this study, I decided it was
too cumbersome to analyze the documents on top of the interview transcripts given the
scope of this study. They have, however, served as supplementary data to the interviews,
assisting in the verification of certain points of information, and have been useful for
keeping abreast of recent developments since I conducted the interviews (i.e., the on-line
agendas and meeting minutes).

Validity and Limitations
All data collection and analytic strategies, whether qualitative or quantitative,
have strengths and weaknesses. Berg (2001:3) describes qualitative research as referring
to the “meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and
descriptions o f things. In contrast, quantitative research refers to counts and measures of
things.” In practice, however, they are often combined, as when I open coded my
transcripts, a qualitative method, and then proceeded to count the frequencies of certain
codes, a quantitative method. However, my research for this study is largely qualitative.
The vast majority o f the data is written text, obtained through interviewing the study
participants and subsequently transcribing their spoken words.
In theory, the content analysis I completed should be reproducible by someone
else. I tried to be as systematic as possible when interpreting and evaluating the responses
o f the participants and “summarizing” their perspectives into categorical “codes.” I also
repeatedly checked over my coding categories to look for inconsistencies, overlapping or
unclear codes, or other problems, and revised them accordingly. The overall aim of this
revision was to ensure that each code was mutually exclusive.
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My choice to use an inductive approach stemmed from my desire to present this
research from the perspective of the participants. I am an outsider to Indianapolis,
unfamiliar with the nuances and realities faced by residents there. Thus, the words of the
participants’ best reveal how water privatization and public participation intersect in their
circumstances. This will be reflected in Chapters Four and Five when I use numerous
direct quotes from the interviews to demonstrate the findings. Berg (2001:246)
summarizes this approach by saying:
[In] order to present the perceptions of others (the producers of messages)
in the most forthright manner, a greater reliance upon induction is
necessary... The development of inductive categories allows researchers to
link or ground these categories to the data from which they derive.
Furthermore, grounding the categories to the data also allows for extension to established
theory.
With that said, I began this research with prior knowledge o f water privatization
and public participation in the U.S. This knowledge contributed to the questions in my
interview guide and how I framed the interviews. Thus, there is some balance between
my own perspective at the beginning of the research process and that of the participants
throughout the remainder.
There are also certain limitations to my research approach. First, my participant
sample is relatively small at only seventeen people. Making conclusions can be
challenging with such a small sample. Since I was only interested in interviewing “key
players” in the partnership, however, I think the sample was sufficient and represented a
spectrum o f interests and perspectives. In the same vein, limiting my research to only one
U.S. city may also be a weakness. As I described in Chapter Two, every U.S. city has a
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unique set o f political, social, economic, and ecological circumstances that cause them to
consider or enter into a public-private partnership for their water utility. Thus, making
any comparisons between Indianapolis and other cities, or applying any conclusions
drawn from this research to other partnerships, may be difficult. Even though every city
is different, however, I think some room still exists to use the perspectives of these study
participants, and what can be learned from them, in other locations, and in relationship to
existing theory. Lastly, Berg (2001:259) argues that an additional limitation to content
analysis is that it is “ineffective for testing causal relationships between variables,”
especially when presenting frequencies and patterns in the data. Therefore, although I
will present the relative frequency of certain perspectives, these frequencies only serve to
give the reader a sense o f the extent to which a theme recurred among the interviewees.

Concluding Thoughts
Qualitative research can be an extremely challenging and rewarding process.
While it is often more difficult to grasp than its quantitative counterpart, it can also be
enormously fascinating. As social beings, there is something matchless about being
exposed to the unique perspectives of other people, and hearing those perspectives
through their own words, especially when we can relate our own experiences to theirs. I
hope this research, and the research approach I chose, serves to adequately represent the
perspectives o f the participants in Indianapolis. Moreover, with the addition of my own
perspective and analysis, I hope some new ideas and understanding, however small they
might be, may emerge as a result.
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CHAPTER FOUR
CHANGING HANDS: VIEWS ON THE DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
AND PUBLIC PARTICIPATION
The next two chapters present the findings of this research, with analysis
interspersed throughout. Together, the chapters support the central argument of this
paper: the intersection o f water privatization and public participation in Indianapolis has
produced mixed results with respect to authenticity. Some o f the results mirror the
cautions and concerns found in the literature about these issues, including a lack of
transparency in the decision-making process, poor timing of the public participation, and
inadequate public outreach and education throughout the decision-making process and
the ongoing partnership. On the other hand, some of the results represent new, hopeful
and positive developments, including Veolia’s support for public input into its operations,
the continuing growth o f the advisory groups, and the connection between the Citizen’s
Advisory Group’s evaluation o f Veolia and a percentage of Veolia’s incentive payments.
Whether these new developments will produce authentic public participation remains to
be seen.
The chapters roughly follow a chronological order pertaining to the events in
Indianapolis. This chapter begins with a reiteration of the basic circumstances
surrounding the decision-making process and preceding events, followed by a description
o f the study participants’ perspectives on the decision-making process that the City of
Indianapolis went through to form the public-private partnership. This includes the
participants’ opinions on who participated, what went well, the concerns they have, and
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why they think the City bought the IWC and formed a public-private partnership for its
management (as opposed to other management options).

The Decision-making Process and Preceding Events
After acquiring the privately-owned, publicly-traded Indianapolis Water
Company (IWC) in 1997, NiSource, Inc. conducted negotiations to merge with the
Columbia Energy Group, a regional gas company, from the summer of 1999 through
November 2000. After this merger was completed, federal regulations forced NiSource to
sell some of its non-gas related assets, including the IWC. In August 2000, the City of
Indianapolis discovered they had right of first refusal for the IWC and they conducted
due diligence proceedings to accurately determine the IWC’s assets. Then, in July 2001
they signed a letter o f intent to buy the IWC for approximately $515 million. In
December 2001, the City formed the Department of Waterworks and its governing board,
the Board of Waterworks, to receive the assets of the IWC. They also issued a Request
for Proposals from private corporations to operate and manage the soon-to-be publicly
owned water utility. Four months later, on April 30,2002, they officially bought the
IWC. The following day. May 1,2002, USFilter (now called Veolia) took over
management of the utility.
In general, two decisions were made. First, the City decided to buy the IWC.
Second, it decided to form a public-private partnership to manage the water utility. It is
difficult, however, to separate these two decisions in the interview data, especially since
they happened simultaneously. Some participants had knowledge and views on both
decisions, others only on one, and some on neither. Thus, when I refer to the “decision-
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making process,” I am referring to both decisions and the time frame described above
starting with the City’s involvement after November 2000. When necessary, I will be as
clear as possible about which decision a participant is referring to, or whether they are
referencing the entire process generally.
Only nine out o f the seventeen participants were directly involved in the decision
making process in some way. Of those, some were intimately involved, either as
decision-makers or consultants, and others were peripherally involved as citizens or IWC
employees providing input. However, all of the participants expressed some perspective
on the process, even if their direct involvement did not begin until after the public-private
partnership began.

Who Participated
According to the study participants, the people who participated in the decision
making process fell into four categories: 1) elected officials in the City-County
government, 2) hired consultants to the city, including engineers and law firms, 3)
members of the public, and 4) IWC employees and union representatives. I characterized
these four groups o f people as supporting, opposing, or being neutral about the decisions,
which is how these findings are presented below. I was interested in this characterization
because I thought it would be useful to understand the degree of support and opposition
to the decisions and whether certain groups of people tended one way or another. Ten of
the participants had views on who opposed the decision, six on who supported it, and
four on parties that were neutral.
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Supporting the decisions
According to the study participants, the vast majority of people who supported the
decisions were elected officials in the City-County government (Indianapolis has
operated under a consolidated City-County government, often called Unigov, with the
City of Indianapolis and Marion County, since January 1970; they also have a CityCounty Council). The most often-cited people were the President of the City-County
Council, Beurt SerVaas, and Mayor Bart Peterson. For instance, Carlton Curry, the City
employee who oversees the contract, said in regards to the decision to buy the IWC,
“Initially, the idea [came from] the President of the City-County Council and the Mayor,
who happened to be of opposite parties.” Also, two participants mentioned that there was
a “bi-partisan majority” on the City-County Council supporting the decisions. However,
others disputed this, arguing that the supporters were primarily Democrats, with a few
Republicans crossing the partisan line to form a majority. These Republicans included
Beurt SerVaas and the Chair of the Public Works Committee, Beulah Coughenour, who
oversaw the initial meetings on these decisions. Alan Kimbell, former IWC executive and
former Board of Waterworks member, described the tension in the City-County Council
by saying, “There was a divided opposition and.. .there were three or four Republicans
who went along with the City’s plan and the Mayor had all the Democratic Council
members lined up..
Thus, while there is some dispute about whether the support of the City-County
Council was strongly bi-partisan or not, the main support for these decisions came from
within the City-County government. There was also strong leadership by the Mayor and
the President o f the Council, with all six of the participants that commented on supporters

57
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

mentioning these two individuals. The reasons for support are discussed in a subsequent
section.

Opposing the decisions
Ten participants commented on opposition to the decisions. Eight of these people
mentioned members o f the City-County Council, including members who opposed the
sale of the IWC to the City and those who believed its management should be put under
the public trust o f Citizens’ Gas. For instance, Alan Kimbell said, “Some of the council
members felt...that it should’ve been handled through the gas company. Others, the very
conservative wing o f the council, felt the city shouldn’t be in it at all and it should be sold
to whoever would buy it.” Some o f the participants did not make this distinction,
however, simply expressing that there was opposition in the City-County Council.
Employees of the IWC and their union representatives, “environmentalists,” and people
concerned about larger issues o f privatization and foreign management were also
mentioned as opponents, but only by a few study participants. The most visible
opposition, therefore, was internal to the City-County Council, with a few external
groups such as IWC employees coming forward to raise concerns.

Neutral participants
Lastly, some people and groups were mentioned as being involved in the
decision-making process as “neutral” parties rather than visible supporters or opponents.
Four study participants commented on these neutral participants. They cited the Public
Works Committee on the City-County Council; attorneys hired by the City; technical
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consultants and engineers who wrote the Request for Proposals, evaluated the proposals,
and made final recommendations to the Council on the choice of a private partner; the
union at the IWC; various citizens at one or many public hearings that was held before
the Public Works Committee; general consultants to the City; and NiSource, during the
negotiations to buy the IWC, There was some dispute, then, about the extent of public
involvement, with one participant citing only one public hearing and another contending
there were many. This discrepancy is addressed more in following sections.

A Summary
Considering the supporters, opponents, and neutral parties described above,
elected officials in the City-County government fell into all three categories. They
constituted the most frequently cited support and opposition, and were roughly divided
along partisan lines (Democrats supporting, Republicans opposing, except for a few
Republican leaders who were supporters), with some dispute about the extent of this
division. The opposition in the Council was also divided between those opposing the sale
of the IWC to the City and those opposing the choice o f management through a publicprivate partnership. Hired consultants to the City were characterized as neutral, although
clearly they were working for and with supporters of the decisions. Members of the
“public” were referenced as being in opposition, and were characterized as
“environmentalists,” those concerned with larger issues of privatization and foreign
management, and as simply the “public.” Finally, the employees of the IWC were noted
as being in opposition, with the union being either opposed or neutral about the process.
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W hat W ent Well: Positive Aspects of the Decision-Making Process
With the participants in the decision-making process outlined, we can now turn to
the perspectives o f the study participants on the decision-making process itself. To begin
with, what went well? Seven of the seventeen participants commented on this question,
with two simply stating “Nothing”. The answers of the remaining five participants
included: 1) the good working relationships of those involved in the decision-making
process, 2) public involvement, 3) details of the contract negotiations, and 4) protecting
IWC employees from layoffs. Each of these categories is addressed in turn below.

Working together
The most often-cited positive aspect o f the decision-making process was how
people worked well together, with five people referencing this aspect. This was
characterized in two ways: 1) working well together inside the official decision-making
process, and 2) positive relationships that developed outside of the official process. For
instance, Carlton Curry, the City employee overseeing the contract, noted.
We had incredible cooperation among the various groups of legal, fiscal,
engineering, citizen groups. We had incredible cooperation all through
that and people felt that they had a voice in the various public hearings,
things of that sort. Oh, there’s some people that said —There should have
been more [public hearings], etc. But by and large it went very well and
we put this together in a... very short period o f time. That could not have
been done without a tremendous amount of cooperation and hard work.
The general thrust of Curry’s comment, therefore, refers to the official process that took
place within the City-County government and the general cooperation of everyone
involved.
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On the other hand, two participants described new alliances that developed
between environmental and labor groups outside of the official process. Tim Maloney,
Executive Director of the Hoosier Environmental Council, said, “I think we developed
some new alliances as part of the process in terms of.. .getting to know the union people
and their getting to know us and.. that may lead to some constructive alliances in the
future.”
Additionally, Glenn Pratt, a member of the Technical Advisory Group, described
how prior relationships that existed with regards to a public-private partnership for the
Indianapolis sewer system assisted in establishing the water supply partnership the
Technical and Citizens Advisory Groups. He said:
Because. ..John Mutz [the first Chair of the Board o f Waterworks] and
Beulah knew m e...I was able to put things [on the agenda]...otherwise,
you would not even have the Technical and Citizens Advisory [Groups].
Those were [not] going to be included. But because having worked with a
couple of people and having some credibility.. they said [that they were]
glad that [the advisory groups] happened.
Thus, according to Pratt, relationships that existed prior to the water partnership
contributed to the creation of the Advisory Groups, which he saw as a positive part of the
process. Overall, about a third of the participants felt that both supporters and opponents
worked well together during the decision-making process.

Public involvement, contract details, and employees
Three of the five participants who identified positive aspects of the decision
making process mentioned public involvement. This included the belief that people were
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given a voice at the public hearing and that given the time constraints, citizen groups did
well at raising awareness about the partnership and soliciting scrutiny from the Council.
Additionally, two participants characterized the formation of an incentive-based
contract positively. Carlton Curry, in reference to the fixed-price incentive contract, said,
“We want to try to keep this as competitive as we can, and so the way to do that is to
place these boundaries on an operator who would have. ..a motivation to achieve a
desired result.” In other words, the decision to construct the partnership contract so that
part of Veolia’s yearly payment from the City (25 percent) is based on meeting certain
performance measurements provides a financial incentive or motivation for them to hold
iq) their part o f the bargain. The choice to create an incentive-based contract echoes
Gleick et al.’s (2002:41) recommendation to include “explicit performance criteria and
standards” in the contract to ensure transparency and accountability by both partners. As
far as I know, this is the first time this type o f contract has been used for a water supply
partnership and with such a large utility. Furthermore, the specific incentives are
important; for instance, one of the incentives relies upon the yearly evaluation of the
Citizen’s Advisory Group (GAG). If Veolia does not get at least an 85 percent
satisfaction rating from the GAG, they lose 1 percent of their total incentive-based
payment. Also, the incentives change throughout the contract, requiring higher
performance levels as the contract progresses. This level of direct influence may be a new
development in how the public is allowed to participate in an ongoing public-private
partnership, along with being a very tangible avenue of influence. The Advisory Groups
will be discussed in detail in Chapter Five.
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Lastly, two participants described positive aspects related to the IWC employees.
These aspects included that the City instituted a moratorium on layoffs for the first two
years o f the contract, Veolia committed to honoring the bargaining agreement of the
unions, and some government oversight was retained with regards to the reasons for any
future layoffs. Also, good retirement packages were granted to those who retired during
the acquisition process. During their review of U.S. water privatization, the National
Research Council (2002) concluded that workforce issues need to be seriously
considered. As I describe below, however, while there have been positive intentions in
terms of the moratorium on layoffs, etc., workforce issues have been very contentious in
the IWC partnership.
Accordingly, only five of the participants had anything to say about what went
well during the decision-making process (some of the abstentions were due to lack of
knowledge but two people said outright that they thought nothing went well). With this
minimal response to the positive aspects, the logical next question is: what are the
participants’ concerns about the decision-making process? If so few things went well,
what were the challenges and concerns?

Challenges and Concerns about the Decision-Making Process
Study participants had much more to say about their concerns than they did about
what went well during the decision-making process. These concerns fell into the
following categories, in decreasing order of frequency: 1) contract details, 2) public
involvement, 3) legal issues, 4) time issues, 5) employees, and 6) politics. They are
presented in this order below.
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Contract details
Fourteen o f the seventeen participants expressed concerns about some aspect of
the contracts themselves (I am calling the agreement of sale a “contract” although it is not
ongoing like the partnership contract). These concerns addressed specific details of the
contracts and the contract negotiations with both NiSource and Veolia. The most oftencited concern was that the City paid too much for the utility, as six people expressed.
Alan Kimbell argued, “They paid way too much for this utility and any leader of a private
water utility in this country would tell you that they wouldn’t have come close to paying
what the City paid for this property.” Jim Bradford, a Republican member of the CityCounty Council, also expressed, “We paid too much for this utility. There’s no way that
we’re ever going to be able to recoup the money that we have sunk into this thing.” And
finally, John Price, the plaintiffs’ lawyer in the two lawsuits filed against the City, said,
“They paid at least twice what it was worth based on what it had sold for not too many
years before” (NiSource bought the IWC for $288 million and then sold it for $515
million five years later; Miller 2003). The participants disagreed about how this price was
set. Some believed the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (lURC) established the
price, while others argued that it was simply negotiated by the City and Veolia. However,
Jerry Webb, Director of the Gas/Water/Sewer Division at the lURC during the decision
making process and today, commented, “We were the ones. The Commission was the one
that established the purchase price. We had the authority to do that. So they filed with us
to determine the purchase price and approve the sale.” Whether it was through
negotiation or through the lURC, the purchase price was certainly an area of concern.
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Also, some participants believed that the price will continue to impact the City in the
future due to the interest on the bonds issued to raise the $515 million.
Another concern that five participants expressed was that the decision was
“steered” to hire Veolia for the contract and that one of the other bids was actually more
appealing. Clarke Kahlo, Program Director o f the non-profit Protect Our Rivers Now,
remarked:
I think they were steering the whole process to hire USFilter.. .they short
listed to United Water and USFilter and there may have been another one
but it appeared that they were working hard, that the Board [of
Waterworks] was predisposed, prejudged, predetermined, that they would
award the 20-year contract to USFilter.
One reason given for this perception was that the other company. United Water, is in
charge of the public-private partnership for Indianapolis’s sewer system, a contract
negotiated under a prior City administration. Thus, United Water “worked for the
enemy,” as one participant put it, and Mayor Peterson’s administration did not want to
give them an additional contract. This perception of the City administration “steering” the
process towards Veolia suggests a lack o f transparency about the reasons Veolia was
chosen, mirroring Gleick et al.’s (2002) caution about making sure negotiations are open
and transparent. Clearly, it is not completely understood what made Veolia’s bid more
^pealing than the bid of United Water. The study participants’ concerns about public
involvement will further illuminate this topic of transparency and perhaps shed some
light on why five of the participants did not trust the City’s decision to hire Veolia.
Next, four people also believed that the contract was underbid by Veolia, making
their bid financially more appealing. On the other hand, two other people argued that
United Water underbid the contract even more which is why the City ultimately chose
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Veolia. Greene (2002) notes that this is a common problem with privatization.
Corporations purposely bid low on contracts with the hopes of recouping their losses in
the future. Whether this was actually the case in Indianapolis is unknown; however, JeanMichel Seillier, the Veolia employee who oversees the contract, did note that while
Veolia has been losing money, they have been losing less with each subsequent year. He
remarked, “The first year we are talking about $10 million [in losses], the next year it was
$5-6 million. And this year is going to be minus two, and next year it will be just minus a
little thing.. .the break even [point] is going to be.. .2009 or 2010 where this will be a
profitable project.” Perhaps since corporations can now sign twenty-year contracts with
cities (Hobbs 2003), the dynamics o f bidding are changing because the private partners
now have more time to recoup their initial losses. It is impossible to establish whether
the contract was underbid, but important to note that this common concern exists with
respect to the IWC partnership.
In general, concerns about details of the contract and the transparency of the
decision-making process seem to be intimately connected. Did the City pay too much for
the IWC? Was the decision-making process “steered” towards Veolia from the start? Was
the contract underbid? All of these questions stem from a lack of knowledge and
understanding on the part of the participants about the reasons for the decisions,
producing skepticism and doubt in the decisions themselves. One participant even
described how the perception that the Board of Waterworks is umnterested in public
participation “contributed to the general level of citizen suspicion and distrust and
skepticism with the whole process.” To understand this better, the participants’ concerns
on public involvement is addressed next.
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Public involvement
Public involvement was a major concern, with ten people commenting on it. The
concerns fell into four sub-categories: 1) negotiations happened “behind the scenes” and
the partnership outcome was predetermined from the beginning, 2) public input was not
taken seriously and even discouraged, 3) the April 30“*deadline agreed upon by the City
and NiSource inhibited adequate public involvement, and 4) more public outreach should
have occurred.

A Predetermined Outcome? Seven participants believed the decisions were
primarily negotiated behind closed doors, resulting in a “predetermined outcome” when
the public was finally given the time to provide input. Tim Maloney, Executive Director
of the Hoosier Environmental Council, remarked.
From the outside it looks like it.. .had all the makings of a sweetheart deal.
[A] lot of negotiating was going on behind the scenes... it was almost a
predetermined outcome when it came to the formal, official proceedings
and official decision...it was more or less presented as a done deal...and
that caused a lot of skepticism and suspicion over the process and whether
the city had made the best deal and chosen the best applicant for the
position...
Thus, according to Maloney, the “predetermined” nature of the decisions created
suspicion over the decision and the decision-making process. TAG member Glenn Pratt
also commented that:
The decisions that are made are all behind closed doors. And there is no
real citizen participation. How much should citizens participate? How
much do citizens want to? But you can seek out those people who do have
interest and try to get their input as opposed to them having to break down
the door.
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While Pratt recognized that there may have only been a small group of citizens that
wanted to provide input, he believed the City erred in not proactively seeking these
people out. The issue of creating space for public involvement at the end of the decision
making process, mentioned by Maloney, comes up frequently in public participation
literature. Webler and Renn (1995) call this a form of “therapy” where citizens are asked
to participate after a decision has been effectively made (although perhaps not officially).
Chess and Purcell (1999) also discuss the “reactive” position the public is often put in
when they are only asked to respond to issues gfter they have been narrowed down to a
final option, rather than participating in a discussion of all of the alternatives. In this case,
there seems to have been only one public hearing before the Public Works Committee
about these decisions, along with public comment periods at the City-County Council
meetings. Although one participant suggested there were many hearings, Beulah
Coughenour, Chair of the Public Works Committee at that time, remarked that there was
only one, and that there were only “two or three” members of the public present. This
suggests that the public was only minimally involved in these decisions, and lends weight
to the perception that much of the negotiations occurred “behind closed doors.”
Furthermore, Jim Bradford, a City-County Councilman, remarked that, “through
this whole process a lot of us on the City Council felt.. .that the ship had already left the
port...and we tried to bring up to the Council that we had problems with this.. .Now,
they’ll tell you that they spent all this time, but they didn’t do it in public. They did it in
private.” There were issues, then, of negotiations happening behind closed doors within
the City-County Council itself and with respect to public input. Given the large scale of
the City-County Council in Indianapolis (it has 29 members), most decisions are
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discussed in committees first and then brought to the larger Council for final discussion
and decision-making. If Council members tried to raise alarms about the process and
were discouraged or ignored, that is significant to our understanding of the decision
making process overall.

Discouraging public involvem ent Eight study participants believed that public
concerns were openly dismissed or that the City was not receptive to public input, either
from members of the “general public” or the employees of the IWC. Tom Plummer, a
current employee o f the IWC, stated, “When they started having... City Council meetings
on the issue, I requested that I could speak in front of the Council and they denied it.
That’s part of my First Amendment violations, that they wouldn’t let me speak.”
(Plummer was the lead plaintiff in the class-action lawsuit filed against the City to recoup
alleged losses of employee benefits since the inception of the partnership; the only count
the lawsuit won related to violations o f his First Amendment rights). He also said,
I went [to a City-County Council meeting].. .and it was never opened up to
allow people to come up and speak. And after it continued and we would
get up there and they would just not let us speak, [they said], ‘We’re not
going to hear you tonight. And it’s not open to public testimony. We’re
not going to allow you to speak.’
Tim Maloney also said, with respect to the City administration in general, “They were
never very responsive to the critics or really tried to...in good faith, address the
criticisms. They just blew them off and were very dismissive of the criticisms. ..I think
they basically circled the wagons and dismissed the critics.”
The Board o f Waterworks meetings are another venue where participants believed
public input was discouraged. Glenn Pratt remarked, with regards to these meetings,
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They fought public participation. The attorney to the board, in fact, tried to
convince John Mutz [the Chair of the Board of Waterworks] that
he.. .should not even allow public comment. [Later, under a different
Board President], the attorney convinced [the new President of this, and]
public comment was cut off untU citizens appealed to the Mayor.
Finally, the President of the largest union at the IWC, Bob Reed, said.
We met with City officials.. and now I know why they met with us.
Because of this bid process there was a gag order on everything because of
the five businesses that were trying to bid. They didn’t want us out talking
to them and they [were] trying to get die best deal fi-om each one, and they
[asked] us at one point if we could just be neutral and not talk to either one
of them.

The decision-making process, then, may have lacked “authentic” participation, as
described by King et al. (1998), Plummer described how he was not allowed to speak at
City-County Council meetings. Maloney remarked that critics were not listened to or
taken seriously. Pratt indicated that public comment was completely cut off for a few
months at the Board o f Waterworks meetings. And Reed said that the union was asked
not to communicate with the potential private partners. All of these perspectives suggest
that public input was not taken seriously by decision makers, and perhaps even actively
discouraged. Alternatively, this may be an issue of different expectations of decision
makers and the public about what public involvement actually means, such as Roberts’
(1995) distinction between public “consultation” and public “participation.”

Impacts o f the AprU 3(f^ deadline. A third area of concern with respect to public
involvement was how the April 30* deadline for the sale of the IWC inhibited public
knowledge and input into the decision-making process. Five participants, or half of the
ten that commented on public involvement overall, expressed this perspective. For
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example, when asked about public participation in general, lawyer John Price answered,
“There was zero. They didn’t give anybody enough time. It was all done in six
weeks.. In terms of public input, public interest groups, consumer utility advisors, none
of these people had enough time, or lead time, to get involved. So it was almost done in a
vacuum.” Furthermore, Alan Kimbell, former IWC employee and former Board of
Waterworks member, remarked, in reference to public involvement, “They didn’t have
time. They rushed the decision through the various boards and council hearings and then
the full Council and the public just didn’t get involved in the discussion.” This deadline
was certainly unique to Indianapolis, and how the deadline was established remains
unclear in the details (it is discussed more below in the section “Issues of timing”).
Only nine months passed between the letter of intent the City signed to purchase
the utility and the sale of the utility and establishment of the partnership. On the other
hand, nine months is a substantial amount of time, and perhaps with the right leadership
and initiative, considerably more public involvement could have been organized. At the
very least, as Glenn Pratt suggested, citizens and groups that clearly had an interest in the
water supply could have been proactively consulted.

Lack o f public outreach. Lastly, one participant mentioned that there was an
inadequate amount of public outreach to educate the community on the decision-making
process. Jim Bradford, City-County Councilor, said.
What they should’ve done, they should’ve gone out and had town hall
meetings at each one of the townships and did that kind of thing but they
didn’t do it. They knew they didn’t have to do it. They were just going to
follow the steps of the law that they were required [to].. .having a public
meeting with Beulah Coughenour [Chair of the Public Works Committee]
and that was it.
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This sentiment echoes Gleick et al.’s (2002) suggestion that cities conduct public
outreach and formal public review prior to the signing of any contracts or agreements.
While only one participant made this suggestion, it seems clear that the City of
Indianapolis did not conduct any public outreach beyond the one public hearing that was
scheduled.

Legal issues
After public involvement, legal issues were the next most-cited concern among
the study participants, with nine participants citing this issue. While there were a few
legal issues addressed, the most prominent issue revolved around the legality of the
public-private partnership under the laws and statutes of the Unified Government
(Unigov) between the City of Indianapolis and Marion County. All nine participants
expressed this concern.
In short, a lawsuit was filed on behalf of a group of Marion County citizens
alleging that, under Unigov law, any new public utility shall be placed under the
management of the Department of Public Utilities, and specifically under the public trust
tiiat currently manages the Citizens Gas and Coke Utility (see Appendix C for the
specific statute referenced). Jack Miller, President of the Indiana Alliance for Democracy,
Board Member of the Hoosier Environmental Council, and a journalist, stated, “There’s a
law, the Unigov law, that states that any new utility has to be put imder Citizen’s
Gas.. .it’s black and white.” Furthermore, John Price, the lawyer that filed the Unigov
case against the City, said, “In the text of the Unigov statutes, one of the things that they
required was that if the City ever buys a utility, it has to be under the public charitable

72
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

trust that operates the Gas Company.” And finally, Clarke Kahlo remarked, “[The]
Unigov statute [contains] mandatory language that water utilities and electric and gas
shall be operated by the Department o f Public Utilities.”
The participants’ perspectives on why or how the City circumvented Unigov
suggest that the City simply ignored the statutes. Jack Miller explained this by saying,
“They pay a lot o f money for these outside law firms to come in and tell them how they
can get by with this.. the gist I got was that [the law firms] said, ‘Nobody’s going to
care...Go ahead and do it.’” Citizen activist Clarke Kahlo concurred by saying, “They
paid Somers and Barnard, this big law firm in town, they paid them I don’t know how
many hundreds or thousands or millions to basically circumvent state law, the Unigov
statute.”
This concern echoes those described above about the details of the contracts,
suggesting distrust in the City’s choice of management and frustration at not having a
clear answer as to why they did not choose the public trust option. While Carlton Curry
did remark that it was “debated at some length about how best to govern this thing,” this
debate apparently did not happen in a public forum.

Issues of timing
The compressed time fi*ame of the decision-making process was another concern.
Eight participants cited this concern, with four of them believing that the City
administration should have taken more time with the decisions in general. Three
participants commented on the deadline itself, with some thinking that it was legitimate

73
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

and others not. Finally, three participants openly questioned the honesty of the deadline,
even proclaiming it to be an outright lie.
The deadline itself was supposedly negotiated by the City and NiSource.
However, the details o f this are unclear and the interview data provides differing views
on what actually happened. One participant said that it was “imposed by NiSource,”
while another remarked that NiSource simply “used” the deadline as a way to get more
money out o f the City. Jack Miller stated that it was a “lie” and it was:
a cover story because they have the right of eminent domain and the state
told them they did. They could’ve condemned that property and given
them a fair market price for it. NiSource didn’t have any right to be telling
the City that they had to sign this thing by April 1®*or whatever it was [it
was April 30*]. They didn’t. I mean, they did [tell them that] and Mayor
Peterson, for some reason or another, which we haven’t figured out yet,
went along with it. But I think it was mostly so he could have the cover of
doing this thing just like that [in a short time firame].
Regardless of how the deadline was agreed upon, it clearly had an impact on the
decision-making process, forcing everything to happen, as Carlton Curry put it, “in a very
compressed period of time,” and on an “incredibly short time schedule.” This short
schedule also impacted the extent of public involvement and generated skepticism and
distrust in the process itself.

Employee issues
The fate o f the IWC employees was an additional concern for eight of the study
participants. The most prominent concern related to the letter Mayor Bart Peterson wrote
to the employees and retirees of the IWC in July 2001 (nine months before the
partnership began) stating that regardless of who was chosen as the “professional third
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party manager,” the employees’ benefit packages would be protected (see Appendix D
for the text o f this letter). There is continued dispute about the circumstances of the
current benefit package, with the City maintaining that benefits have actually improved
under the partnership and some o f the employees claiming that they have been drastically
reduced. Each side did their own analysis and produced different figures supporting their
claims, so it is difficult to say who is right and who is wrong. However, a group of
employees did file a lawsuit against the City, as noted in Chapter Two, over the loss of
promised benefits (as stated in the Mayor’s letter), and a ruling was issued in August
2004, According to Tom Plummer, the lead plaintiff in the case, the judge dismissed
eleven of the twelve counts “because all the promises from the City Administration and
USFilter came before the City had fiduciary responsibility over the utility.” Thus, the
Mayor’s letter was not legally binding. The twelfth count was issued in the employees’
favor, however. According to Plummer, Federal Judge Hamilton stated in his response,
“The court must give the plaintiffs the benefit of their factual allegations and of the most
favorable reasonable interpretations of documents. The court must assume, therefore, that
the assurances in the Mayor’s letter were deliberately false.” This gave the employees
“the only satisfaction that we got out of this fight,” according to Plummer. Thus,
transparency in regards to how the partnership would impact the employees of the IWC
seems to be a significant issue and it has obviously spilled over into the ongoing
workings o f the partnership through the lawsuit. This lawsuit is discussed further in
Chapter Five during the discussion of present-day concerns.
Other concerns that emerged with regards to IWC employees included that the
employees would not have wanted to become City employees if City management had
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been considered; that the employees were unrealistic in expecting the same benefits; and
that the union tried to “work outside the box” on their new benefit package but received
no support fi-om the City in this endeavor.

Politics
The next major category that emerged as a concern among the participants was
the influence of politics on the decision-making process, with seven participants
commenting on i t The concerns about politics were characterized in different ways. Four
people suggested that politics may have influenced the decision-making process because
it occurred during an election year. For instance, Tim Maloney said:
1 think we [citizen groups] had a lot o f disadvantages in terms of our
involvement as well as really gaining enough interest and support from
critical officials like some of the City-County Council members in terms
of their really being willing to go to the mat [and]... scrutinizing this and
following through, [since we were] in the midst of an election season.
Therefore, Maloney suggested that the election season may have made City-County
Councillors less willing to become involved in a potentially controversial issue such as
the public-private partnership. Beulah Coughenour expressed a similar sentiment by
saying, “The year we did that [make the decisions] it was getting close to an election year
and you have a lot of politics involved.” She did not go so far as to suggest it restricted
Council members fi-om being involved, however, as Maloney did.
Furthermore, three participants were concerned that politics may have influenced
the decisions because politicians’ focus on elections restricts them from taking a long
term view in decision-making. Interestingly, one participant contrasted this with the
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private management of the utility, where he thought a long-term view would be more
likely. Joe Broyles, former President of the IWC, stated:
The Indianapolis Water Company.. .only dealt with the water business and
took a long term view.. .The future of the Indianapolis Water Company
was tied to the fiiture o f Indianapolis so we saw growth in the City as
being a good thing.. .What we saw as long term was ten, twenty, thirty,
fifty years. Well, the planning horizon for any politician is.. .maybe the
end o f next term, [and] it certainly isn’t more than eight years. It’s not by
any means the plannmg horizon you need when you’re really dealing with
a utility, especially a water utility when you’ve got a plan to prepare for,
sources to supply for many, many years [into] the future. So unless you
find a politician who’s only looking altruistically, and I don’t know that
there are any o f those.. .they’re looking to take care of their own, the
people that got them where they are.. .they just have different interests,
political interests.
Broyles believed, therefore, that a private utility will more effectively plan for the future
than a public utility when public officials are more concerned with their own “political
interests.” The structure of the Indianapolis government may contribute to this
perspective. The Indianapolis-Marion County government does not have a City manager
form of government. Instead, all City offices are either elected or appointed by elected
officials and thus are inherently political and possibly short-term. When a new Mayor is
elected, a new City administration comes with him or her.
Chris Burton, the Business Manager for the largest union at the IWC, also
commented on the influence o f politics by saying:
They told us they want to keep politics out of it yet they’ve done
everything to keep politics in it. . .If they want to keep politics out of it, put
us in the trust [the public trust that runs the gas company]. Right now,
politics plays such a big role here, it’s unreal. That’s all it is. It’s all
political.
Interestingly, critics of privatization cite politics as being good for privatization because
it forces the consideration o f issues other than purely economic ones (Greene 2002). A
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more specific definition of what participants meant by “politics” may have been useful in
this case.

Why Did They Decide to Privatize?
The last major topic that needs to be addressed is the participants’ perspectives on
why the City decided to buy the IWC and form a public-private partnership for its
management in the first place. Clearly, Indianapolis was unique in that it was
simultaneously negotiating to buy the private utility while also deciding how to manage
the IWC once it was publicly-owned. Most cities that consider public-private partnerships
already own and manage their utility, and for various reasons are exploring alternative
management options. The uniqueness of Indianapolis, however, also makes this question
especially intriguing. If City administrators were concerned about the ownership of the
IWC, and did not want another private corporation to buy it, why did they then decide to
hand over all of its operation and management to a private corporation? Why was local
ownership important yet local management was not? Alan Kimbell expressed this
question in part by saying:
The City leadership in both parties [said], we cannot have our water
utility, vital to life, owned by some shareholders in France. So they
conceived a plan to acquire the utility.. The plan was to acquire the utility
and then immediately contract the operation of it to one of the handful of
international contract operation companies.
By exploring the participants’ perspectives on this topic, I hoped to start answering the
questions above. I was also curious whether the reasons commonly cited in the literature
regarding why cities choose privatization were relevant in this case as well. These include
such reasons as increased efficiency through the introduction of competition, the
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expertise private corporations can bring to the table, and access to private capital. Finally,
by trying to understand why they made the decisions they did, I also hoped to further
understand why the public was or was not included in the decision-making process.
In short, sixteen out of the seventeen participants commented on this topic. A
variety of categories emerged as to why the City bought the IWC and formed the
partnership. These include, in decreasing order of frequency: 1) the history o f publicprivate partnerships and the gas company (Citizen’s Gas & Coke Utility) in Indianapolis,
2) a desire for local control, 3) financial reasons, 4) politics, and 5) efficiency.

Nothing new?: Indianapolis history
Ten study participants cited some aspect of Indianapolis’s history when giving
their perspective on this topic. Nine of the ten specifically described the history of other
utilities in Indianapolis, although they characterized this history both positively and
negatively. The utility history they described included: 1) how the City tried
unsuccessfully in the 1990’s to buy the Citizen’s Gas & Coke Utility in an effort to exert
more control over it (resulting in ongoing dislike among City administrators for the
City’s lack of control in this area), 2) how the electric company was sold to the private
sector with poor results, and 3) the success of the public-private partnership for
wastewater treatment (established in the early 1990’s and where the advisory groups were
originally implemented). An additional historically-based reason was lingering influences
o f the Goldsmith Administration in the 1990’s. (Former Indianapolis Mayor Stephen
Goldsmith was nationally known for promoting the privatization of public services; see
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Ritchie and Kennedy 2001 and Goldsmith 1997 for different perspectives on his
administration.)
Six participants referenced the City’s unsuccessful attempt to buy Citizen’s Gas in
the 1990’s or the general dislike for Citizen’s Gas and its autonomy from City influence.
Beulah Coughenour, former City-County Councillor and current Board of Waterworks
member, remarked, “[We] had tried to buy that company some years back because we
thought we could do some good things with it. And they fought us tooth and nail..

On

the other hand, lawyer John Price described the situation as follows:
The head of the City-County Council, his name was Beurt SerVaas, had
tried about 10-12 years ago, to take over the Gas Company because they
wanted to sell it and raise money to build a downtown mall. He soon
found that the public charitable trust was set up over a hundred years ago
in such a way Üiat he couldn’t sell it. He was rebuffed in his efforts. He
couldn’t take it over. And he was ticked about that and so when it came
time to buy the water company, he decided, well. I’m not going that route
again. I don’t want the Gas Company to operate this because we don’t like
the Gas Company. We don’t like the public charitable trust. We’ll create
our own political division, which they call the Department of Waterworks.
Finally, Chris Burton said that, “Beurt SerVaas tried, I don’t know how many times, to
break the trust [the public charitable trust that oversees Citizen’s Gas] and sell the Gas
Company. They could never do it.” Therefore, an historical factor existed in that there
may have been some frustration and dislike within the City administration for the
governing structure of the Citizen’s Gas & Coke Utility, and a subsequent desire to set up
the water utility differently. Former President of the City-County Council Beurt SerVaas
was mentioned frequently in the interviews as an influential and powerful figure who did
not like Citizen’s Gas and who worked hard to set up the Department of Waterworks as
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the governing body for the IWC. Without Dr. SerVaas’s perspective on the matter,
however, it is not fair to go any further in establishing his influence in this situation.
With that said, there did seem to be a general movement within the City
administration to set up the publicly-owned IWC so that the City could have control over
its management and operations. Carlton Curry expressed this by saying:
We have another company, called Citizen’s Gas & Coke Utility, which is
a charitable trust, allegedly managed by the City, as a charitable trust, and
it’s under a different statute. [The statute] provides it as being [under] the
Department of Public Utilities. And there were some people that felt that
this operation should go under this umbrella. But some people don’t like
the governance structure for that. We wanted to have a much tighter role
for Indianapolis Water.
This “tighter role” of the City was partly manifested through the creation o f the Board of
Waterworks. The Board o f Waterworks is appointed by the Mayor, with three members
nominated by the President of the City-County Council, three members by the Minority
Leader of the Council, and the last member nominated by the Mayor. This creates a bi
partisan board with the seventh member (nominated by the Mayor) only voting in the
event of a tie. The Board o f Waterworks is, therefore, the main public body responsible
for overseeing the operations, management, and budget of the IWC, in partnership with
Veolia. This is a different governance structure than the public charitable trust that
manages Citizen’s Gas in that the leaders of the City-County Council and the Mayor have
direct influence over who is on the Board.
Is this direct influence by the City administration positive or negative? This leads
into the next most-cited reason why the City decided to buy the IWC and manage it
through a partnership; local control.
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Local control
Seven participants mentioned local control as a reason for buying the IWC and
managing it through a partnership. Five o f them commented on local control in general,
viewing this is a positive alternative to ownership by another private corporation. Six
participants, on the other hand, believed that the City administration specifically wanted
more control over the IWC because the public trust could not provide this, as partly
described above.
First, only one participant explicitly said that he thought that a privately-owned
utility was a better choice than a publicly-owned one. All of the other participants, no
matter what their views were about tiie public-private partnership, thought that the new
local ownership was a positive development. According to Alan Kimbell, former IWC
employee and former Board o f Waterworks member, “The City leadership in both parties
[said] - we cannot have our water utility, vital to life, owned by some shareholders in
France.”
What exactly the City intended to do with this new control, however, was an area
o f contention. Beulah Coughenour argued that, “[Citizen’s Gas is] publicly a trust of the
City, but there is a self-electing, self-promulgating Board. There’s never any public
involvement. They have no accountability to anybody...[There’s] no public input.. .at
all.” She felt that by creating the Board o f Waterworks, the City would have more control
over the IWC. By comparing it to Citizen’s Gas, she remarked, “[If] you don’t have any
way to have any input after you let loose of it, then how can you make sure it’s
successful?” Thus, by having more oversight over the IWC than they currently have over
Citizen’s Gas, the City will be able to better manage the utility.

82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

On the other hand, some participants felt that increased City involvement was
negative. Chris Burton, for instance, said:
Well, here’s my fear...Somewhere down the road, whether it’s next
month, next year, or ten years, twenty years from now, the City’s going to
be needing some money. And somebody’s gonna have that light bulb go
off, and say, let’s sell the water company. Look how many millions of
dollars we can get if we sell the water company. Then who knows what’s
going to happen here. And if we were in the trust that could never happen.
Burton, therefore, views increased City control as leading to less stability and he does not
trust the City administration to manage the IWC for the long-term. He makes a
distinction between the “City” and the “public,” believing that public ownership is good
but not with control by the City administration. His ultimate fear is that the City will sell
the IWC someday, whereas being governed by a public trust is more stable. Chris further
elaborated on this belief by saying:
We [leaders of the union] had a meeting with the Mayor, and we asked the
Mayor about the trust, and he told us, no, that they weren’t interested in
going that way because they can’t tell the Gas Company what to do. He
said, and this is his words now —‘The Gas Company does what they want
to do and they’ll call us and say, ‘Hey, this is what we’re doing,” so
they’re [the City] still in the loop. Like they’re in the loop a little bit, he
said, but they [Citizen’s Gas] do what they want. [He said,]‘We don’t have
any control over them.’ They want control here. So that if they ever want
to sell it, they can.
Hence, while local control was important to almost all of the participants, where
they wanted that control situated —either in a public trust under the Department of Public
Utilities or through the Board of Waterworks —differed. Some felt that legally the IWC
belonged under the public trust (as illustrated by the lawsuit that was filed against the
City), while others believed that the public trust would provide a more stable and less
political environment for managing the utility. Others believed that the City needed a
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stronger hand in the management of the IWC, and this was accomplished through the
creation of a Department of Waterworks and the establishment of a public-private
partnership.

Financial reasons
Six participants mentioned a variety of financial reasons as a basis for the
decisions. Their reasons included that the City could make money fi-om a partnership for
other public programs (although as far as 1 know, money earned by the IWC is
exclusively earmarked to cycle back into the company); City ownership provides tax
advantages; the City felt that the IWC employees were overpaid and a private manager
would be better equipped to accommodate this; and, well-connected people within the
City-County government served to financially benefit fi-om the partnership.
Clearly, a municipal government does have financial advantages over a private
corporation in its ability to acquire low-interest loans and bonds to finance capital
projects. The other concerns, however, cover a broad spectrum, and are difficult to relate
to one another.

Politics
Politics was another reason given for the decisions, with five participants
mentioning an aspect of this topic. Three participants felt that the political impacts of
campaign contributions played a role in the decisions. For instance, TAG member Glenn
Pratt commented, referring to the final choice between USFilter and United Water, “[It
was about] who’s on your side and who’s made contributions and who hired all the right
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people. You know, who did United Water hire as part of their thing and who did USFilter
hire?...There was all types of alleged shenanigans that went on.” Other perceptions
included that the partnership was a compromise between the Mayor (who wanted to buy
the IWC) and Republican Councilors (who wanted the IWC to remain private), and that
Council President Beurt SerVaas simply wanted to leave a “legacy.” While politics may
have played some role in the decisions, then, there were various views on how great the
extent was and in what way politics contributed.

Efficiency
Finally, efficiency was given as a reason for the decision to form a partnership by
five participants. This included the belief that cities do not manage utilities well because
they have a lot of “red tape”; that the City was incapable of running the IWC; it is
difficult to run a formerly for-profit corporation in a non-profit way; and that the
partnership would allow the City government to operate more efficiently. As with other
categories, the participants characterized “efficiency” in very different ways. Some felt
the government itself could not be efficient enough to operate the IWC successfully,
while others felt that the partnership would provide the efficiency that comes with
running the utility as a “business.” While these are similar characterizations, they are
different in that one focuses on the inefficiency of the government and the other focuses
on the efficiency of the partnership. For instance, Jean-Michel Seillier, the Veolia
employee overseeing the contract, remarked, “I think we bring to the table. ..efficiency.
We can run the business in a more efficient manner.. than the government.” In some
ways, this is ironic in the case o f Indianapolis because the government has never operated
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the IWC (with the exception of a few years in the late 1800s), making its lack of
efiBciency entirely speculative. Jack Miller expressed this irony by saying, “You get the
usual window dressing that private companies are more efficient and they’re more savvy.
But, you know, they came in here and used the same employees...They came in and
learned from the employees how to run this water company.” Increased efficiency is a
common reason given by proponents o f privatization, however (Greene 2002),
Tim Maloney provided an alternate view of efficiency by saying:
[There is] a business model.. .being embraced by a lot of government
people.. .that we need to operate government more efficiently and that’s
fine. I don’t think anyone disagrees that government should be run
efficiently. ..but that’s not the same as privatizing, necessarily. There are
plenty o f examples of governments that are still in government hands that
are being run efficiently and being run well... [To] simply say the only
way we can [be efficient] is to turn it over to the private sector is wrong.
Efficiency, then, like politics, may have played some role in the decision to form the
public-private partnership. The participants differed in how they characterized this
efficiency, however.

Why the decisions were made: a summary
Clearly, with a contract o f this magnitude (both temporally and financially), there
were probably a variety o f reasons why the City decided to buy the IWC and contract out
its management to a private partner. Some decision makers may have felt more strongly
about one reason over another while also recognizing that there were numerous
advantages and disadvantages to any chosen course o f action. Given the perspectives of
the participants in this study, however, the two most prominent reasons were the various
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historical precedents in Indianapolis and a desire for more local control. Financial
advantages, politics, and efficiency also played a part.
The historical precedents, such as the success of a public-private partnership for
the sewer system and the perception that the City did not have enough control over the
gas company, seem to have led the City administration to the public-private partnership
alternative quite rapidly. Also, they did not consider the other options with any public
input. The history of partnerships in Indianapolis and the familiarity with privatization in
general (through the Goldsmith administration, for instance) possibly led, therefore, to
alternatives being discussed “behind closed doors” and with little transparency to
interested citizens and citizen groups. It seems plausible that if privatization were entirely
new, and the City administration was not already familiar with its structure and workings,
they may have spent more time discussing its advantages and disadvantages in a more
public forum. With partnerships already part of the modus operandi in Indianapolis,
however, creating another one may have felt routine and not warranting extensive public
involvement Thus, Indianapolis’s history of privatization may have impacted public
participation negatively during the decision-making process, reducing formal public
involvement to only one public hearing
In addition, the desire for local control presents an interesting suite of
perspectives. While almost all o f the participants believed that the increase of local
control through buying the IWC was a positive development, they differed on where they
though that control should be situated. Should local control lie with the public trust that
operates the gas company? Or should local control reside with the Board of Waterworks,
whose members are bi-partisan and appointed by the Mayor? Simply by owning the IWC,
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more public involvement is possible. For instance, rules exist requiring public comment
at Board meetings and citizens can exert influence through City-County Councilors.
Public involvement through the privately-owned IWC was essentially limited to the
Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission. Why the City decided to create the Department
of Waterworks, rather than go with the public trust, seems to be steeped with suspicion,
confusion, skepticism, and conflicting explanations. This indicates a lack of transparency
and openness about the reasons for their decision. Furthermore, this opaqueness has
continued to impact the public’s perception of the partnership to this day, as is indicated
in the discussion of present-day concerns in Chapter Five. Finally, considering
Indianapolis’s history and a desire for local control together begins to answer the
question o f why local control through ownership was important but local management
was not.
Conclusion
The study participants clearly had a variety of perspectives and opinions about the
decision-making processes in Indianapolis. Their responses to the four main topics that
were covered in the interviews - who participated, what went well, concerns, and why
they privatized —produced a wide range of answers. While some o f these response
categories are more relevant to public participation than others, even the categories that
do not have a direct relationship to public participation (e.g. the financial reasons for why
they chose a partnership) still provide a useful context for the decision-making process.
The key findings from this chapter include the following:
1) Members of the City-County Council were the primary participants in the
decision-making process, and included both supporters and opponents. The public
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and the employees of the IWC were only peripherally involved and provided a
minimal amount of input.
2) Five participants described positive aspects of the decision-making process,
including good working relationships, public involvement, the creation of an
incentive-based contract, and the contract provision prohibiting employee layoffs
for the first two years o f the partnership.
3) The choice to make the partnership contract “incentive-based” echoes Gleick et
al.’s (2002:41) recommendation to provide “explicit performance criteria and
standards” in the contract. The participants’ views on how this type of contract
has operated in it first two and a half years are addressed in Chapter Five.
4) Study participants raised a variety of concerns that indicated the decision-making
process was less than transparent. These concerns included that the City paid too
much for the utility, the process appeared to be “steered” to favor choosing
Veolia, the contract was underbid, the IWC should have been placed under the
public trust, the April 30*** deadline was not legitimate, and the Mayor was
dishonest in his letter to the IWC employees. This suite of concerns is impressive
and raises serious concerns about the extent to which study participants still feel
in the dark about the reasons for the decisions and their frustration with this lack
of understanding. Thus, these concerns indicate that the City government did not
adequately inform the public about the reasons for the decisions it made.
5) There were minimal opportunities for public input into the decision-making
process. These included one public hearing after the decision was effectively
made and ongoing public comment periods at the City-County Council meetings
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and the Board of Waterworks meetings. This led some of the participants to
believe the outcome was “predetermined.” Chess and Purcell (1999) support this
perception by discussing how the public is often put in a “reactive” position by
being informed at the end of a decision-making process.
6) Some study participants were concerned that public input was discouraged and
not taken seriously. This is juxtaposed against the discussion of “authentic
participation” as described by King et ai. (1998:3) where participants feel their
input is “important and actually being considered by decision-makers.”
7) There was minimal, if any, public outreach during the decision-making process.
This works against Gleick et al’s (2002) recommendation to conduct public
outreach prior to signing any partnership contracts.
8) Politics were a concern o f some participants. Privatization opponents, however,
argue that politics can be beneficial because it forces the inclusion of issues other
than purely economic ones (Greene 2002).
9) Indianapolis history and a desire for local control were the two most often-cited
reasons given for why the City decided to buy the IWC and manage the utility
through a public-private partnership. I suggest that the strong history of
partnerships in Indianapolis may have contributed to minimal public
involvement because City decision-makers were already familiar with how
partnerships work. Had the partnership been a new policy alternative, perhaps the
public would have been involved more in the decisions. Local control through
ownership, on the other hand, was characterized in different ways by study
participants. While almost all the participants believed the new local control was a
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positive development, some felt this control was appropriately situated with the
Department of Waterworks while others felt the control should be located in the
public trust with the Department of Public Utilities.

Thus, as far as how water privatization and public participation intersected during
the decision-making process, Indianapolis seems to have fallen into many of the traps that
are cited in privatization and public participation literature and the few works that
analyze the two topics together. Overall, there was very little public participation in the
decision-making process. Furthermore, the one public hearing occurred near the end of
the process, placing the public in a reactive position. Rather than being allowed to
provide legitimate input and possibly influence the course o f action, the public was only
informed. A perceived lack of transparency serves as a common thread throughout much
of the discussion about the decision-making process. Furthermore, it is a lack of
transparency on the part of the City-County government, not Veolia. This distinction is
important to remember in the next chapter when discussion of public participation turns
in part to the role of Veolia, the private partner.
In this situation, the avenues for public participation did not end when the
decisions were made. Rather, they have continued in both similar and differing ways
during the first two and a half years o f the partnership (from May 2002 through August
2004, when the interviews occurred). It is during these subsequent years that a different
kind o f understanding can be gained about how public participation is intersecting with
water privatization in an ongoing partnership. Thus, the study participants’ perspectives
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on the working partnership and ongoing avenues for public input are the subject of the
second chapter of findings.
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CHAPTER FIVE
THE FIRST TWO AND A HALF YEARS: VIEWS ON THE PARTNERSHIP AND
PUBLIC PARTICIPATION

At the time I conducted the interviews, two and a half years had passed since the
I n d ia n ^ lis Department o f Waterworks signed a 20-year contract giving Veolia the
reigns to operate and manage the Indianapolis Water Company. While the IWC is now
publicly-owned for the first time in its 120-year history, its operation and management
remains with a private corporation (henceforth, I combine the functions of “operation”
and “management” into simply “management,” although they are different functions).
This marriage o f public ownership and private management is not new in and of itself. As
described in Chapter Two, the privatization of public services has a long history in the
U.S., including in the case of water utilities. The recent introduction of 20-year contracts
and TNCs into the U.S. water industry, however, has created new dynamics with regards
to privatization. Furthermore, these developments have led to water supply partnerships
in larger U.S. cities than typically existed in the past (the IWC serves over a million
people, placing it in the largest class of water utility).
From the perspectives of key players in the IWC partnership, then, what has been
going well during these first two and a half years? What have been the main challenges
and concerns? And how has the public fit into this new situation? The participants’
answers to these questions are the focus of this chapter.
The participants’ perspectives on the benefits and challenges of the partnership
are presented first, followed by their views on public involvement and the advisory
groups. Study participants often mentioned public participation in their discussion of
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benefits and challenges, however. Since public participation is the focus of this study,
though, I chose to treat this topic separately. In addition, some of the benefits and
challenges do not at face value seem to have much relevance to public participation and
the larger questions of this study. Water quality and quantity is one example of this. I
chose to include these topics because they represent issues that citizens are concerned
about, and that could be addressed through improved public participation strategies. For
instance, some of the concerns raised by study participants about water quality may
actually be misperceptions. It would be valuable for the partnership to more thoroughly
address these misperceptions and promote increased understanding among concerned
citizens about what is actually occurring.

Benefits of the Partnership
It is often easy to focus on the challenges of new situations. All new situations
have them and the IWC partnership is no different. It is just as important to understand,
however, what is going well so that these successes can be capitalized and expanded
upon. Thus, one of the questions 1 asked study participants was what they viewed as
being the primary benefits of the new water partnership in Indianapolis. Three
participants explicitly said that they could not think of any benefits. Three participants
did not respond to the question for one reason or another. That leaves eleven participants
that commented on this question (three o f these eleven could only think of one benefit,
the new public ownership that was discussed in Chapter Four). A variety of categories
emerged firom the responses, including, in decreasing order of frequency: 1) public
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ownership, 2) water quality/quantity issues, 3) customer service and rates, 4) financial
issues, 5) working together, 6) employee issues, and 7) accountability.

Public ownership
Similar to the discussion of local control through ownership in Chapter Four,
eight participants mentioned public ownership as an ongoing benefit of the partnership.
Beulah Coughenour, former City-County Councilor and current Board of Waterworks
member, expressed this advantage by saying, “We own the water and that’s important to
me. ..I think it is for all the people.” Tim Maloney, Executive Director of the Hoosier
Environmental Council, also said, “[At] least here in Indianapolis, while the management
is private, the ownership is still public.. .and that we fully supported... [that] has got to be
the way.” Even some of the current and former IWC employees expressed satisfaction
with public ownership. IWC employee Tom Plummer commented, “I still think it was a
good move to go.. .public. I think every community should own their own.” Thus, almost
half o f the participants believed that public ownership remains a positive development for
the IWC. This seems natural given the strong history of water as a public resource in the
United States.

Water quality and quantity
Water quality or water quantity issues were mentioned by four participants as an
additional benefit. Indianapolis water has historically had taste and odor problems, in part
due to the ecology o f the water source. The majority of the water supply consists of
surface reservoirs, making bacteria and other biological inputs prevalent. Dick Van
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Frank, a member o f the Technical Advisory Group and retired chemist for Eli Lilly, felt
that these taste and odor issues were being addressed more successfully under the
partnership as compared to under private ownership.
In addition, in terms of overall water quality and quantity, Carlton Curry, the City
employee overseeing the contract, said, “The water quality is higher than it was. We
[also] have less water being lost into the system. We have a main break reduction
program.” Thus, VanFrank and Curry believed that water quality has improved under the
partnership, and Curry also felt that the partnership has improved water quantity issues.

Customer service and water rates
There were a host o f customer service, billing, and rate issues on the table when
the City bought the IWC and handed over management to Veolia. For instance, the
partnership inherited a challenging billing system from NiSource. In addition, the City
secured a five-year rate freeze for the customers of the IWC through the management
contract itself. Four participants felt that these various customer service issues have been
a benefit.
Jerry Webb of the Indiana Utility Regulatory Commission (lURC) commented,
“The primary benefit I can see currently has been the rate fi’eeze.. .the customers won’t
get a rate increase for five years, which should be up in ’07.”
Carlton Curry and Beulah Coughenour also mentioned improved customer service
standards with the new incentive-based contract. Lastly, Clarke Kahlo, Program Director
of the group Protect Our Rivers Now, commented on the increased control for rate-setting
under the partnership. With the privately-owned IWC, the lURC was responsible for
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approving any rate increases. Now, responsibility falls on the Board of Waterworks since
the lURC only has an informal relationship with the partnership. Up to this point, this has
not been an issue with the five-year rate freeze. Starting in 2007, however, rates will be
an issue for the partnership.
All o f these customer-service related benefits seem to be connected to the increase
in local control that came with the sale of the IWC, and the details that the City put into
the contract itself. It is impossible to say what the situation would be if NiSource had
remained the owner, if the IWC was managed by the City, or if it had been sold to
another private corporation. Perhaps similar improvements would have occurred or
perhaps not. For approximately a quarter of the study participants, however, there have
been customer-service related benefits to the partnership.

A summary of benefits
Ongoing public ownership, improved water quality, and superior customer service
were die three most often-cited benefits of the partnership. It is interesting to note that the
participants who had the most to say about benefits were also those who worked for the
City or Veolia. Beulah Coughenour cited nine categories of benefits, Carlton Curry
referred to five benefits, and Jean-Michel Seillier also mentioned five benefits. Other
participants mentioned between zero and three benefits. This could be due to a few
factors. First, these three people probably know the inner-workings o f the contract better
than

others. It is Curry and Seillier’s job to oversee the contract for the City and Veolia,

respectively, and Coughenour just finished a one-year term as Chair of the Board of
Waterworks in December 2004. Perhaps this knowledge enabled them to see positive
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sides to the partnership that others are simply not aware of. Another perspective is that
these three people were interested in presenting the partnership in a positive light to me.
While it is difficult to establish their motivations, or the accuracy of the benefits
mentioned, it is clear that the participants overall did not have a great deal to say about
the benefits of the partnership. Especially in light of the large number of concerns they
mentioned (covered in the following sections), the benefits were relatively sparse.

Concerns about the Partnership
As was the case with concerns about the decision-making process, the study
participants had a great deal to say regarding their concerns about how the partnership
operated during its first two and a half years. A large set of categories emerged fi*om their
responses. The most frequently-mentioned categories (with the exception of public
involvement which is addressed in a separate section) included: 1) water quality and
quantity issues, 2) financial issues, 3) employees, 4) accountability, and 5) contract
details. Additionally, it is important to keep in mind that these could be the types of
issues raised by concerned citizens in Indianapolis at a public forum such as the advisory
group meetings.

Water quality and quantity
Issues of water quality, water quantity, and water safety were mentioned by
eleven o f the seventeen participants. For example. Jack Miller, Board Member for the
Hoosier Environmental Council and journalist, and one of five study participants that
commented on water quality, said:
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[They’re] cutting back on [water quality] testing... Instead of doing some
of this sophisticated testing over there now electronically, they’re doing
litmus tests, blister packs of litmus, [and] that’s pretty subjective.
[Someone might say], ‘Well, I don’t know, what do you think? Green,
blue?’ And then you write it down and toss the litmus paper away and then
you’ve got, ‘Well, it looked blue to me.’ That’s not a valid objective test.
Since Veolia is required under the Safe Drinking Water Act to conduct and report
adequate water quality testing, this might be an issue that needs to be more fully
explained to concerned citizens to allay fears about inadequate or reduced testing.
As far as water quantity, citizen activist Clarke Kahlo was concerned about
progress on a “surface water management plan for quantity,” but was also hopeful that
Veolia would start working on this issue soon. City-County Councilor Jim Bradford, on
the other hand, presented a different view by saying, “[Veolia] has no incentive to create
more volume in the water supply.. .if they create more volume, the City gets more
money, but there’s no incentive for them because they don’t get anything out of it.” This
speaks to the reality that, like many U.S. cities, Indianapolis and the surrounding area is
growing. If the customer base increases without a parallel increase in water supply, there
could be problems with the quantity of water available. This seems to be an issue that the
partnership will have to work on together.
Lastly, seven participants brought up issues of water safety, with five o f them
concerned that recent cuts in IWC employees has compromised the “backup” power of
the workforce in times of emergency (thus possibly compromising the safety of the water
supply). For example, Alan Kimbell said:
They have bought out or retired huge swaths of middle management in
that company. So there’s no redundancy of personnel. ..W hen.. .our canal
breached ten or fifteen years ago, they were able to mobilize quickly and
get the system back on line. If it happened today, the system would go
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down, there would be enormous fire hazard risk, [and] it would take I
don’t know how long to get it back in shape and all the water would be
undrinkable that they managed to get out.
Thus, these participants are concerned that the reduction in the workforce is
compromising the “layers” of employees that existed before. All of the treatment plants
in a water supply system have to be operated twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week.
There is no time when they are closed. Thus, in a time of emergency, if a great deal of
people-power is needed, there has to be “redundancy in personnel,” as Kimbell put it, or a
set of people that all know how to do the same thing. That way, some of those people can
continue to run the day-to-day operation of the utility while others can tend to tiie
emergency at hand.

Financial issues
Financial concerns were mentioned by eleven participants. These concerns
emerged as relating to the City’s finances, Veolia’s finances, and the potential for the
profit motive to interfere with providing safe water.
Five participants mentioned a concern about Veolia’s finances. Jean-Michel
Seillier, the Veolia employee overseeing the contract, raised the issue from Veolia’s
perspective by describing the challenges in reconciling how much money Veolia believes
is needed for capital expenditures and the amount the City has available.
On the other hand, a couple of participants were concerned that Veolia has been
“skimping” on paying for maintenance and fixing infrastructure problems. Both of these
concerns, although characterized differently, identify a challenge in the partnership. The
City provides the money for capital expenditures but Veolia is responsible for
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implementing and overseeing the capital projects in conjunction with the Board of
Waterworks. How this aspect of the partnership is worked out will be an ongoing process.
Concerns about the City’s finances were varied. For instance, one concern
referred to the amount of money the City has spent defending itself in the various
lawsuits it has faced with respect to the employees and the Uni gov statutes, while another
related to potentially high bond payments resulting from the purchase price for the IWC.
Finally, three participants were worried about the potential for Veolia’s profit
motive to interfere with the mission of providing safe water. Tim Maloney commented,
“Their first and principal mission is [and] should be providing a safe and dependable
water supply to the community and. ..do the profit interests of a private company
interfere with that?” In addition, TAG member Glenn Pratt said, “We do have ...real
concerns. ..[that] if you’re strictly a nuts and bolts [corporation] maximizing profit,
you’re going to be cutting comers.” Maloney and Pratt both feel, then, that the need for
Veolia to make a profit may interfere with the safety o f the water supply, because they
might have to “cut comers” to make any money. As described in Chapter Four, however,
Jean-Michel Seillier did point out that Veolia is not currently making a profit, and does
not expect to until 2009 or 2010. With that said, there is still the potential for them to be
cutting comers today to minimize the amount of money they are losing. This is difficult
to discern with either supporting or contradicting evidence; however, this potential for the
profit motive to interfere with the partnership is an interesting assertion given the history
of the IWC as a private corporation. Although the participants’ did not specifically
express this, perhaps there is a difference in their perceptions of the former IWC and
Veolia because of Veolia’s status as a TNC. Joe Broyles, former President of the IWC,
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commented that, “Their kids don’t drink the water,” referring to the Veolia executives
that oversee Veolia’s operations in Indianapolis from afar. This perception of how much
the new management of the IWC cares about its operations also arose in the participants’
concerns about the employees, along with other categories.

Employees
Concerns about the employees of the IWC under the partnership were prevalent,
with ten of the seventeen participants commenting on this issue. These concerns can be
further divided into the following sub-categories: 1) loss of benefits and pay, 2) union
issues, 3) loss of employees and, 4) psychological issues. Also, I devote considerable
attention to this concern because it is one that is inadequately addressed in the literature
and has been especially high-profile in Indianapolis.

Loss o f benefits and pay. Nine participants expressed that they were concerned
about the loss of employee benefits and/or pay under the partnership. Tom Plummer, the
IWC employee who filed the class-action lawsuit about the benefit losses, commented:
I was penalized approximately $100,000 in my pension.. .because o f my
age and I will fail now to have a health care plan when I retire. So it was a
huge hit. A big hit...W e [those involved in the lawsuit] did hire a benefit
accountant, a group to come in and study our benefit losses and [they said]
we had lost $50 million in benefits just between the non-union employees
over the 20-year contract. So it was substantial. But the City to this day
will tell you that we didn’t lose anything.
Plummer also felt that the Mayor’s letter to the employees prior to the partnership was
instrumental in creating the backlash that has occurred regarding benefit losses (see
Appendix D for the text o f the letter). He acknowledged that changes are to be expected
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with a new employer, yet the Mayor’s letter gave false promises to the employees.
Plummer expressed, “[The Mayor] lied when he wrote that dam letter.. .1 still remember
him getting up to the podium at [a] news conference talking about taking care of the
employees and it was just all a ruse.”
Similarly, Alan Kimbell, former IWC employee and former Board of Waterworks
member, remarked:
Despite the Mayor’s promise, they significantly reduced the value of the
benefits, most notably in the defined benefit pension which the non-union
people all have watched. The union people stood firm and kept it in their
contract but that may [change].. ,I think the employee situation is going
firom bad to worse and I’ve got severe reservations about how they’ll be
able to make it work.
Finally, former IWC President Joe Broyles said:
The Mayor wrote a letter and in very plain English it says you won’t lose
your Jobs, your benefits. Your pensions and such are secure. They then
disappeared.. .and for the non-union people, their pensions disappeared
immediately. Now, for the long-term employees, federal pension laws say
that you can’t take the money that was in the pension fund and keep it, but
you can stop adding to it.
Thus, Plummer, Kimbell, and Broyles all felt that benefits have been reduced under the
partnerehip and that the Mayor’s letter in 2001 contributed significantly to the passionate
feelings they expressed. As Broyles indicated, so far the main losses have been to the
non-union employees, which primarily include management positions such as
Plummer’s. In addition, six participants noted that they felt it was a mistake for Veolia to
start cutting benefits right away. Had they waited six months, as one participant
suggested, the backlash could have been significantly reduced.
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Overall, literature on water privatization does not address how these partnerships
Impact employees of the water utility. The one exception is the National Research
Council (2002:7) that suggests that workforce issues need to be seriously considered,
“both as a possible source of cost savings and a focal point for public concern." In this
case, issues of transparency and honesty exist in terms of what was promised to the
employees during the decision-making process and what the outcome has been during the
first two and a half years o f the partnership. To be fair, the partnership and the employees
have arrived at different figures on how the benefits have changed under the partnership.
The City maintains they have gotten better while the employees claim they have
worsened. The ruling in the employees’ lawsuit was in favor of the City but primarily
because the Mayor’s letter was not legally binding. The judge, however, did acknowledge
that the Mayor’s letter was dishonest in its claims. Thus, while the employees may not be
able to change their situation, or receive compensation for their perceived lost benefits,
there does seem to be a serious breach of trust that occurred. Furthermore, the lawsuit
received considerable media attention, thus possibly impacting the public’s continuing
perceptions of the partnership.
The employees that were interviewed also acknowledged that if the IWC had been
managed by the City before, rather than by a private owner, the benefits and pay that
Veolia offers would probably have been comparable or more than previously. Union
Business Manager Chris Burton remarked:
You look at any municipality; they don’t pay the employees that great.
They don’t have that great of benefits... Well, [if Veolia] would go in there
and take those employees over, they would give them.. .a raise.. The
benefits that [Veolia]., .offered [would be] better than what they had. So
those people are happy. Because they did get something. Well, they came
in here. They wanted us to fall under their [benefits and pay] which was a
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cut for us. And they couldn’t figure out why people were unhappy.
Honestly... [They might say], ‘Well, where we’ve gone into these other
places and taken over, those employees were all happy.’ [And our
response would be], ‘Well, yeah, they were happy because you did raise
their standard of living... Here you’re taking away.’ [And] maybe we were
driving the road in a Cadillac but when [they’re] wanting to put us in a
Yugo.. .people are going to get upset! When you take someone from a
Yugo and move them up to a Malibu, they’re happy.
The circumstance Burton described is common to most public-private partnerships.
Public employees become private employees. In this case, however, private sector
employees were simply transferred to a different private corporation. The fact that
Indianapolis is unique in this instance, however, does not negate or invalidate the
employees’ concerns. Rather, this circumstance underscores the reality that each publicprivate partnership is unique, and each City must fairly and honestly evaluate how a
change in management will impact the utility’s employees. If the employees’ pay and
benefits are improved under the new private management, there will not be many
concerns. On the other hand, if they are reduced, there will likely be significant backlash,
as there has been in this instance.

Union relations. Concerns about union relations revolved around the number of
labor grievances filed with the National Labor Board since the partnership began and the
union contract. City-County Councilor Jim Bradford, one of four participants to remark
on this topic, said, “I think they had one grievance [per year]., with NiSource. They
had...fifteen, sixteen, all in favor o f the union [after Veolia took over].” Bob Reed, the
President o f the largest union at the IWC, also commented, “We had seventeen labor
charges we filed within the first six months [after] they came in the door.” Tom Plummer
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described what the grievances were about, by saying, “Cutting pay. Cutting benefits... [to
a specific employee or to] specific classifications. Violations of the [union] contract.”

A shrinking workforce. Two of the nine participants concerned about a shrinking
workforce were simply concerned about a reduction in the number of employees (the
contract did institute a two-year moratorium on layoffs that ended in April 2004;
however, the workforce was reduced through retirement and attrition during that time).
Seven of the participants, however, indicated that the reduction in the workforce has
created a loss o f “institutional memory.” Lawyer John Price remarked, “In order to
operate a utility, you have to have a stable, well-trained, knowledgeable, skilled,
employee base.. .[And] what they [have] succeeded in doing, and what they are still
succeeding in doing, is driving off from the company the people that know how to run it.”
Chris Burton concurred by saying:
Since Veolia took over, we’ve lost.. .people... [with] a thousand years of
knowledge. And they’ve been replaced with people that have less than a
hundred years of knowledge... I mean, a water company is a water
company is a water company is not a water company.. .You can have two
water companies. Yeah, they’re both water companies. They make water.
They pump it through pipes to the customem. But they don’t operate the
same.
Burton’s assertion that different water companies “don’t operate the same” perhaps
relates to the various ecological realities that utilities face. In Indianapolis, the majority of
drinking water is held in a series o f reservoirs and canals. Compared to a utility who taps
underground aquifers for its water, the infrastructure and technology needed to run the
utility is going to be considerably different, along with the technical knowledge and skills
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o f the employees. Jack MiUer, journalist and Director of the Indiana Alliance for
Democracy, continued in this vein by saying:
[They’re] losing their institutional memory over there.. .the institutional
memory goes back 130 years over there. And they're downsizing that
institutional memory, getting rid of it and trying to bring in these people
firom Texas and California and Paris to run an Indimapolis utility which
they don’t know anything about, except what they learn firom the people
that they’re downsizing.
There is a concern, then, th ^ by reducing the size of the workforce and bringing in
employees firom outside the locality, critical knowledge and expertise is lost. How TNCs
deal with this issue will be critical for other cities considering this management option to
consider in the fiiture.

Psychological issues. Finally, six participants expressed concerns about various
psychological issues pertaining to the IWC employees. The most often-cited concern was
a loss o f morale since the partaership’s inception. Union President Bob Reed described
the IWC employees’ pride in their work and the IWC when it was locally owned, and a
subsequent decrease in morale during the first two and a half years of the partnership.
Similarly, Alan KimbelTs number one concern about the ongoing partnership was,
“Continued degradation of employees, both in numbers and in terms of morale of those
who are left.” In addition, Reed commented on how cuts in the workforce have impacted
morale:
[The employees] see what’s happening on the surface right now of them
cutting jobs.. .and they’re saying, ‘Well, why the hell should I care right
now? Why should I give 100%?’ Because the loyalty of the days when the
company was loyal to the employees and the employees [were] loyal to
the company are not here with this company.
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There are indications, then, that many employees are not satisfied with their new
employer and are not as dedicated to their jobs as a result. Such job dissatisfaction seems
especially important in the case o f a water utility where employee retention (and the
resultant growth of institutional memory) is essential in the event of an emergency. While
Reed did not indicate that employees were performing at their jobs any differently^ a lack
of morale could lead to more resignations and less willingness to put in extra hours or
effort.
Another concern expressed was Veolia’s attitude about “improving” the IWC
when they took over management According to union Business Manager Chris Burton:
[Veolia] came in here, saying, ‘We’re going to turn this into a world-class
company.’ Well, you know what, we already were a world-class
company!...It was like, ‘We big city guys are gonna show these country
folk how to do things! We’re gonna bring them out of the stone age into
the modem era! ’
Union President Bob Reed continued by saying;
Through the American Water Works Association, we [were] an icon
because we were so efficiently run with the manpower we had.. .we were a
triple-A company, and [the rhetoric about making us a world-class
company].. .a lot o f people took that hard. Because I mean, we’ve worked
[hard] and then they come in like they’re going to run a better operation.
And to me, it’s the flip-side.
Indeed, increased expertise and access to experts was one of the benefits of the
partnership cited by Jean-Michel Seillier of Veolia. There must be a balance struck,
however, between explicitly acknowledging the expertise and knowledge of the current
employees and the additional knowledge the private partner can bring to the table.
Especially in a circumstance such as this, where the utility was not faltering or
performing poorly when the partnership began, it might be pmdent o f the private partner
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to invest their efforts in validating the current employees and their contributions to the
company. Clearly, there are consequences of decreased morale if they do not, as in this
case.

Accountability
In any public-private partnership, the contract has to explicitly outline which
partner is responsible for what. If certain definitions or details are not specific enough,
however, there can be disagreements among the partners about responsibility. This can
then lead to questions of accountability, which was mentioned by eight participants as an
ongoing concern about the partnership.
Jerry Webb, Director of the Gas/Water/Sewer Division at the Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission (lURC), described the relationship between the lURC and the
partnership as follows:
We tried.. .three or four meetings before we really got the sense of how to
bring [the partners] in because from [the lURC’s] perspective [what] we
got initially was, USFilter would say, ‘Oh, it’s the City.’ And die City
would say, ‘No, it’s USFilter.’ Well, someone, I don’t care who it is, has
got to take care o f the customers. So we’ve been working on it ever
since...
Jack Miller also commented in this vein by discussing the ongoing public liability for the
water supply even though it is privately managed. He said:
The liability is still a public liability. It’s something the public should
expect to be run right. And if something goes wrong, they’re going to
blame the City. And then you get that he said, she said. [The City might
say], ‘Well, we told USFilter [now Veolia] they were supposed to handle
that.’ And USFilter can say, ‘Yeah, but the City said they were going to
take care of that part of it.’.. .Accountability. That’s what I see lost in
this.. .And what I really want to see is this under the public trust. That way
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it would be transparent, it would be accountable. If somebody screwed up,
w e’d know who it was. We’d know who to blame. That’s what’s lost here.
There was also the concern that if something did go wrong with the IWC, the City could
simply fire Veolia, thus absolving the City of any responsibility.
The concerns about accountability in the partnership echo Greene’s (2002)
description o f “sector-blurring,” a common caution among privatization opponents. In
short, when public and private responsibilities are mixed, which party is accountable in
certain situations can “blur.” Concerned citizens may be frustrated if they do not know
who to approach with questions. It can also be a concern for regulatory agencies if neither
partner wants to accept responsibility for an issue and it is not explicitly outlined in the
privatization contract. The contract itself is a primary vehicle for minimizing these
confusions. For example, Gleick et al. (2002) emphasize that a detailed contract can
ensure better accountability between the partners. Furthermore, adequate public
education about the responsibilities of each partner could minimize confusion about who
is accountable for specific issues.

Contract details
Eight participants voiced concerns about specific details of the partnership
contract and sub-contracting, with four people concerned about cronyism in sub
contracting. For instance, one participant commented;
There’s just a lot of speculation and there’s a lot of evidence of
cronyism...and political back-scratching that has come as a result of
having this management structure, in terms of the contractors that have
been selected for...various parts of the purchase and management of the
company.
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While Veolia is responsible for operating and managing the IWC, they can sub contract
various functions and operations. In fact, one of the incentives in the contract requires
them to target a specific percentage of minority and women-owned businesses for this
sub-contracting. The possibility o f sub-contracts being given to members of the Board of
Waterworks or others involved with the partnership was a concern of nearly a quarter of
the participants, however. In this vein, Greene (2002) describes corruption as a problem
cited by privatization opponents. As with many of the other concerns, this concern could
be alleviated by more explanation by the Board of Waterworics and City officials about
the reasons for various sub-contracts, especially if these concerns are publicly voiced by
interested citizens.
An additional concern was the existing contract oversight, Carlton Curry is the
one City employee responsible for overseeing the contract, although one participant
suggested that he has support staff to help him. Gleick et al. (2002) identified effective
contract oversight as one o f their “Principles and Standards” for successful water
privatization but did not describe any details on this issue. Certainly the size of the utility
and the scope o f the operations would impact the necessary amount of oversight needed
for the contract. While Curry did not mention any troubles from his end, the IWC does
serve over a million people, and the partnership has twenty-one inter-govemmental
agreements with other counties and cities. In addition, they manage four smaller water
companies nearby. Whether one City employee is sufficient oversight for this partnership
is difficult to gauge, but it was a concern expressed by study participants.
The Board o f Waterworks also has oversight responsibility but board members do
not have full-time positions. Their operating procedures were a concern to a couple of
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participants, mainly revolving around the focus of their monthly meetings. One
participant described his concerns about the Board of Waterworks as follows:
As the owner of the utility, and as the operator of the Department of
Waterworks, [the Board] can have an enormous influence on what
happens at the water company.. .It’s their responsibility... [Yet] they
choose not to do so. They choose to say [to Veolia], ‘Come in and give us
your little report. Thank you! Be blessed! See you next month!’ And that’s
it. They just choose not to be involved. That’s not the way to run a publicprivate partnership. That’s not a partnership. That would be like a
marriage.. .where one of the partners just says once a month, ‘How’s it
going?’
Another participant described how the Board of Waterworks meetings only consist of
reports from Veolia staff and approval of budgets and expenses. These concerns revolve,
tiien, around the perceived focus o f the Board on almost exclusively financial issues.
Lastly, two participants questioned the value of the incentive-based contract
lURC employee Jerry Webb expressed, “[The lURC] has got continuing concerns
whether the incentives will [force] them to do a good job or are they perverse incentives
that will just make USFilter a lot of money and the citizens don’t really come out that
much better?” Another participant was concerned about the potential for Veolia to “cut
comers” and manipulate figures so that they achieve their incentives.
The contract for this partnership is long at 92 pages and filled with techmcal
language. It is not an easy read (I have only read pieces of it). Yet, it is also an incredibly
important document that drives many of the decisions made about the partnership. There
must be a balance, however, between letting the contract run the partnership and having
actual people run the partnership. Especially given many of the suspicions voiced by the
participants about cronyism and “cutting comers” to achieve the incentives, there must be
sufficient human oversight and interaction to adequately address the concerns of citizens
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and other interested parties. This is addressed further in the section on “Public
Involvement” and the participants’ concerns about the operation of the Board of
Waterworks.
Summary of concerns
Excluding public participation, which is addressed in the next section, there were
a host of concerns about the ongoing partnership that emerged from the interviews. These
included: 1) water quality, quantity, and safety, 2) financial issues, 3) loss of employees
and decreased morale, 4) accountability between the partners, and 5) contract oversight
and the potential for cutting comers to achieve the incentives. Some of these concerns are
addressed in literature on water privatization, such as the importance o f contract
oversight and accountability between the partners. Others, however, such as the impact of
these partnerships on employees, are not adequately addressed in the literature. This
suggests an area for future research, and a facet of public-private partnerships that U.S.
cities in general may need to more thoroughly consider in the future. Finally, the
concerns raised by the study participants are important to keep in mind during the
following discussion of ongoing public participation. How can citizens communicate
their concerns about accountability or employees, for instance, to decision-makers? Do
study participants believe the current avenues for public participation allow sufficient
opportunity for public input? These are a few of the questions answered in the next
section.
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Public Participation Today
The last category o f findings deals with the participants’ perspectives on public
participation during the first two and a half years of the partnership. The first section
describes how the public can be involved today, along with positive and negative aspects
of this involvement. The next section is a more detailed examination of the advisory
groups, including how they were formed, their function and operation, what is going
well, and concerns. The advisory groups are examined in a separate section because this
is largely where new dynamics and developments are occurring with respect to how
public participation and water privatization are intersecting in Indianapolis.

How the public is involved
Study participante identified four avenues for public participation available since
the inception of the partnership. These include: 1) public comment at public meetings,
including meetings of the City-County Council, committees of the City-County Council,
the Board of Waterworks, and the Citizens and Technical Advisory Groups, 2) writing
letters and email messages, along with making phone calls, to City-County Councilors,
City employees such as Carlton Curry, and members o f the Board of Waterworks, 3)
membership on the Citizens and Technical Advisory Groups, and 4) participation in non
governmental organizations such as the Citizens Water Coalition (a consortium of two
unions, the Marion County Alliance of Neighborhood Associations, United Senior
Action, Citizens Action Coalition, Hoosier Environmental Council, the Sierra Club, and
individuals, according to one of the study participants). Webler and Renn (1995)
reference other avenues for public participation that have occurred in Indianapolis, such
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as voting, litigation, and involvement in political parties, along with the first three
avenues identified above. Participation in citizen groups such as the Citizens Water
Coalition, however, is not necessarily considered public participation in that there is no
direct involvement in public government and its processes.

Positive aspects
Eight participants commented on positive aspects of public involvement
throughout the first two and a half years of the partnership (excluding the advisory groups
which are addressed in the next section). The most often-cited positive aspect was
Veolia’s attitude of encouraging public input into the partnership. For instance, Clarke
Kahlo, a citizen activist, described a meeting he had with Tim Hewitt, President of
Veolia’s Indianapolis operations, saying:
I wrote a letter to the editor about losing our floodplains.. .to development.
We’re squeezing the river down and it’s having very adverse
consequences on our river system and [Tim Hewitt} called me up and
invited me to lunch.. .He thought that maybe there were some things, some
synergies and so forth that the company could assist with, in terms of
rezoning things in the future, and so. . .we’ll see what happens.
In addition, Tim Maloney, Executive Director of the Hoosier Environmental Council,
commented, “Veolia and its managers are taking citizen input more seriously and I have
heard lately that they’ve been more receptive to citizen input... I’ve [dso] heard from
some of the other critics that this Citizen’s Advisory Committee, or at least that process,
has been more receptive and open lately.” Finally, TAG member Glenn Pratt believed
that Veolia and City managers have been helpful in improving public participation, but
Veolia more so. He said, “The people who privatized the water company [are] much
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more open [to public participation],” Other positive aspects included the creation of the
Advisory Groups, the increased access to public documents and information with public
ownership, and appreciation for the few City-County Councilors who have “gone to bat”
for the working-class employees.
These positive aspects are interesting because they focus for the most part on
Veolia, not the City, as supporters of public participation. Groups such as Public Citizen
(2003b) have defined “public” and “private” utilities in part on their receptivity to public
participation, with public utilities being more receptive and private utilities less so. In
this case, however, these definitions are not entirely accurate, with the private partner
being more receptive to public input than the public partner. As I discuss in the next
section, many of the negative aspects o f public involvement today revolve around the
Board of Waterworks.

Negative aspects
Ten participants commented on negative aspects of public participation in the
ongoing partnership (excluding the Advisory groups, which are addressed in a separate
section). These negative features emerged as two sub-categories: 1) the response and
attitude of the Board of Waterworks to public input, and 2) concerns about the
functioning of the Board o f Waterworks.
Five participants believed that the Board of Waterworks has actively discouraged
public input, even being “hostile” and “disinterested” completely. Tim Maloney
remarked, “[There] were times when [public input] was discouraged...by the Board
members and the Chairperson saying, “Well, you know, we don’t have time for
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that.. .You’re not on the agenda. We don’t have time.’” Jack Miller described a personal
experience of trying to offer his input at a Board of Waterworks meeting by saying:
[They] were having public comment that night, but they just wouldn’t let
me talk.. .Alan Kimbell was on the Board at that time and he wanted me to
say a few words about.. .some environmental thing because at that time I
was the president of HEC. They said, ‘Well, he can talk if he wants to, but
we’re leaving.’ The President of the Board said that. That’s the kind of
input they like.
According to Maloney and Miller, then, the Board of Waterworks has been unreceptive
to public input, even actively discouraging input during their meetings. Beulah
Coughenour, President of the Board of Waterworks when the interviews were conducted,
offered her perspective on public input by saying:
I bet we’re surprised if more than ten people come., .to the Board
meetings. And what we do is we have the agenda and they know what it is
and then at the end o f the agenda it’s public comment.. But we do want
them to tell us what it is they want to talk about. Because we don’t want
people to just get up there and ramble.. .[and] it’s always the same
people.. .Actually, we haven’t had much public comment.
Coughenour, therefore, was concerned about the focus of public comments and that they
do not address relevant agenda items. She was not particularly concerned with the small
number of public attendees and did not express any desire to have more public comment.
In addition, she was displeased that the “same people” always offered their input. The
timing of public comment at the end of Board meetings may be one reason for the
comments’ lack of focus or the tendency for people to “ramble” in that citizens have an
entire meeting to address and may have multiple concerns.
Citizen activist Clarke Kahlo expressed frustration with the timing of public
comment from a different perspective by remarking:
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They allowed public input begrudgingly.. .they wouldn’t allow public
comment during the agenda items and still don’t, as far as I know. They
relegated, even if it’s a matter that’s being deliberated at the moment, they
push the public comments to the very end after the matter has been
decided. It’s ridiculous. And so there’s a lot of frustration that the Board
was not adequately taking the views of ratepayers and citizens into
account.

Kahlo suggested that having public comment at the beginning of the Board meetings
would alleviate some o f this problem. Since the agenda is available before the meeting,
members of the public could comment on agenda items before decisions are made, thus
possibly having some impact on the decision-making process. Small changes such as this
could contribute to a feeling of more “authentic participation,” as described by King et al.
(1998), whereby the public feels its input is being seriously considered by decision
makers. On a smaller scale, this is also an issue of the timing of public participation. In
e ^ h Board meeting, the public is put in a “reactive” position where they can only
comment after decisions have been made.
Additional negative aspects of public input at the Board of Waterworks meetings
included that for three months there was no public comment at all allowed at the Board
meetings. This was eventually overturned after citizens complained to the Mayor. There
was also a period of time when members of the Board were forbidden to talk with
members of the press or public without permission o f the President of the Board.
For obvious reasons, unlike the participants’ concerns about the decision-making
process surrounding the formation of the partnership, the City-County Council was not
mentioned at all in the discussion of public involvement in the ongoing partnership,
except as one of a list o f available avenues for public participation. This is likely because
the Council has very little decision-making power except for a small amount of influence
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on appointments to the Board of Waterworks. Councilors can still try to talk to Board
members and pass along concerns of their constituents. There is no guarantee, however,
that these messages will be taken seriously or considered. The Mayor himself was also
never mentioned. After the partnership began, the Board of Waterworks became die
public body responsible for the IWC, thus forcing the City-County Council and the
Mayor to take a backseat as far as daily decisions and influence.

The advisory groups
Three advisory groups were created by the partnership when the City of
Indianapolis and Veolia entered into their public-private partnership. These include: 1)
the Citizens Advisory Group (CAG), 2) the Technical Advisory Group (TAG), and 3) the
Service Advisory Board. Study participants knew little about the Service Advisory
Board. Its general function is to advise the partnership about the twenty-one inter
governmental agreements with neighboring counties and cities that are served by the
IWC. These agreements were necessary because the service area of the IWC extends
beyond Marion County. The Citizens and Technical Advisory Groups, therefore, are the
focus of this section of findings. First, I describe how and why they were formed, their
general function, and their operation. Then, I discuss the participants’ perspectives on
what is going well with the CAG and TAG, and their concerns.

Formatioiif function, and operation. The CAG and TAG are a requirement of the
partnership contract, and are modeled after a similar CAG and TAG that advise a publicprivate partnership for the Indianapolis sewer system (the private partner is United Water,
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now owned by TNC Suez/Ondeo). According to Glenn Pratt, a member of the water and
sewer TAGs, the creation o f the advisory groups for the IWC partnership were influenced
by his input and the collaboration o f John Mutz, the first Chair of the Board of
Waterworks, and Beulah Coughenour. Since the advisory groups for the sewer system
have been beneficial, it apparently seemed appropriate to also include them with the IWC
partnership.
According to Exhibit Twelve o f the contract (a table listing the incentive criteria),
the Department of Waterworks chose the TAG and CAG members, although any details
beyond this are unclear. While study participants disagreed on this fact, with some
believing it was Veolia who chose the members, there was agreement that members were
chosen rather than being elected or submitting applications for appointment. It is
uncertain how the initial list of members was generated. Nevertheless, citizens and
technical experts were invited to be on the advisory groups and they serve various-length
terms. There are twelve CAG members and thirteen TAG members (see Appendix E for a
listing of the CAG and TAG membership). The TAG meets once a month and the CAG
every other month at Veolia’s main offices. Meetings are open to the public. According
to the Department o f Waterworks (DOW 2005a) website, the CAG’s function is to:
Provide more customer and community perspective and input into the
water utility management and decision-making process. The CAG will
provide fi’equent communication and feedback on issues relating to the
service provided by Veolia Water to customers of the Indianapolis Water
Waterworks District.
The purpose of the TAG, on the other hand, is to “provide a regular monthly forum for
discussion o f key programs and activities related to water quality, source water
protection, water management, and environmental stewardship” (DOW 2005b).
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Both advisory groups, therefore, advise Veolia, not the Board of Waterworks. In addition,
the CAG is responsible for completing a yearly evaluation of Veolia’s performance. This
evaluation must be 85 percent satisfactory for Veolia to receive one percent of its total
incentives payment (25 percent of the money the City pays Veolia each year is based on
incentives; the CAG evaluation is weighted as one percent out of one hundred percent,
with one hundred percent equaling the maximum amount of incentive money). The
required CAG satisfaction rating will increase to 95 percent in 2006, according to Exhibit
Twelve of the contract. While CAGs are not a new concept, directly tying their
evaluation with a monetary value may be a new development. Certainly, this contract
stipulation makes it worthwhile for Veolia to invest time and energy into the success of
the CAG and its members.
Study participants knew little about how the CAG and TAG meetings are
publicized. Three participants argued that they are not publicized at all. One TAG
member, however, mentioned that he had seen a meeting advertised at the IWC
headquarters with a notice posted on their front doors. 1 saw this notice as well when 1
was there. Meeting information is available on the Department of Waterworks website
but it takes some work to find it. The meeting schedule on the IWC website is out-ofdate. There was no indication o f public outreach or education efforts to inform the public
about these advisory groups and their open meetings. One participant commented, “1just
wish there was some way they could publicize them better. Because 1 think the general
public doesn’t know that they have those three forums [the advisory groups].” Lester
McKinney, a member o f the CAG since its inception, also remarked:
I’m unsure o f how the people are made aware that, if they do have a
concern or an issue.. .they can come in during the CAG meeting and
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express themselves. I don’t know how they’re made aware of this. I’ve
never seen anything publicized that indicated that you’re welcome to come
in and discuss your issue, complaint, or concern, during this time.
While it is positive, then, that these advisory groups exist, not publicizing the meetings in
a thorough manner likely limits public involvement and input and raises questions about
the CAG’s ability to effectively assess Veolia every year.
According to the study participants, the TAG addresses topics brought to them by
the Board of Waterworks and Veolia, along with suggesting areas that need to be
addressed. The CAG, on the other hand, has been mostly reactive in its operation,
advising Veolia on issues brought to the CAG, rather than generating issues on their own.
Six participants felt that the advisory groups (and the public comment period at the Board
of Waterworks meetings) did not provide sufficient opportunity for public input into the
ongoing partnership, with one participant believing that they did provide sufficient
opportunity for public input. The reasons why the participants felt this way is discussed
in the following sections on what is going well and concerns about the advisory groups.

What is going well. Eight participants commented on what is going well with the
advisory groups. In particular, three participants remarked that the TAG had a slow start
but is operating well today. Both Gletm Pratt and Dick Van Frank, members of the TAG,
expressed this view, and felt that the TAG was beneficial and providing valuable input to
Veolia on technical problems and issues. Van Frank also commented that the TAG
members feel invested in what the TAG does and have something to contribute given
their expertise in a certain area. He also believed that the TAG has “opened up” the
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technical operations o f the IWC to public scrutiny that were formerly secret due to
private ownership.
Only two participants had anything to say about what is going well with the CAG.
Lester McKinney referenced the low CAG member turnover, the broad spectrum o f CAG
members from across the City, and room during the meetings for open dialogue with the
public as compared to a strict public comment period. Tim Maloney with the Hoosier
Environmental Council also remarked that the CAG has been opening up more to public
input in the recent past.
Overall, then, both advisory groups had a slow start but are operating better as of
late. Furthermore, since the interviews, the CAG has begun a “restructuring” process.
This process was initiated by the CAG members; they were frustrated with their role of
only giving advice on issues brought to them by Veolia rather than generating issues and
topics themselves. Veolia paid a facilitator to attend a few of the CAG meetings to assist
with the restructuring, but it is unknown how this process has progressed.

Concerns, Eleven participants commented on their concerns about the advisory
groups. These concerns emerged as four sub-categories: 1) an overall negative view of
the advisory groups, 2) membership concerns, 3) logistical concerns, and 4) concerns
tinged with a degree of optimism.
Two participants expressed a generally negative view of the advisory groups. This
included the views that the CAG was “non-existent,” “just show,” and has no power at
all. Concerns about the membership of the advisory groups were voiced by five
participants. One concern was that the CAG is not a “real” citizens’ group because it does
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not have “real citizens” as members, only “insiders.” One study participant felt that CAG
members are “all people that don’t have an open mind.” Another study participant
remarked, “[They] appointed.. .almost no citizens [to the CAG]. You had somebody from
Pepsi-Cola, somebody from Conseco Field House, some developers, and there [are] a
couple women.. .from community centers but [Üiey] didn’t really represent the people.”
Additionally, one study participant believed that half of the TAG members are “non
technical,” making it difficult to produce sound decisions. The advisory group members
are volunteers, and one participant felt this led to a general ineffectiveness o f the groups
since members often miss meetings due to other commitments.
There were also logistical concerns. This included the timing of meetings during
the mid-aftemoon, making it difficult for working members of the public to attend;
inadequate attendance leading to a lack of quorum; secrecy at the beginning of the
partnership about the names o f CAG members and when the CAG met; and the lack of
monetary reimbursements for expenses such as parking during the meetings. These types
o f concerns are cited by King et al. (1998) in their discussion of “authentic” participation.
Holding meetings at convenient times and providing child care and food are two ways of
increasing the “authenticity” o f participation in that they increase the likelihood citizens
will repeatedly participate. Two participants also commented on a lack of commitment by
both Veolia and the City administration to making the advisory groups work. For
instance, one participant remarked, “If you’re being squeezed financially, which this
company is, [then you] don’t want a lot of new opportunities to hire staff and work on
problems.” This study participant believed that the advisory groups may bring up new
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issues for Veolia that would cost money to address, thus limiting Veolia’s desire to make
the advisory groups successhil.
Finally, there were a few concerns tinged with optimism. Lester McKinney
expressed his frustrations with the current operations of the CAG, but was also hopeful
that by restructuring the group, a more effective CAG could be established. He remarked:
I feel as though.. .some of the things that have initially gotten started [on
the CAG] weren’t really the direction we should have been going... I don’t
think that we were living up to what was expected of the CAG. ..I didn’t
feel as though we were there to give or to establish committees and give
reports to the water company on what the water company was doing. And
that’s exactly what we were doing.. .We should be giving CAG feedback
as per the communities where we [live].. .on what the thoughts of the
communities [are] as far as quality of water, billing.. .things that would
affect the communities.. and how best the water company could serve that
particular community.
He continued by suggesting that CAG members could canvas their communities, perhaps
even holding informal meetings on their own with interested community members, and
then they could convey these issues to the larger group. This would serve to “[share]
information with the company about information from the community,” as he put it.
McKinney was frustrated but also optimistic that the restructuring of the CAG would
alleviate some of these frustrations. Additionally, King et al. (1998) indicate that public
outreach that informs citizens on how they can participate, as partly suggested by
McKinney, increases the “authenticity” of participation.
There were a variety of concerns, then, about the advisory groups, with most of
the concerns focused on the CAG rather than the TAG. A majority of the participants
expressed very little knowledge of either group. The overall sense from those that did
know something about the groups, however, was that they both started slowly but
appeared to be operating better with time. Furthermore, Veolia seemed to be supportive
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of their success and desired their input into its operations and management Spending
money on a facilitator to overhaul the CAG is one piece of evidence that supports this
claim.
Vari (1995) describes some o f the concerns cited above as being common to
Citizens’ Advisory Committees (miother term for a CAG). These include the inability to
define their own agenda, as mentioned by CAG member Lester McKinney, and a
tendency for little outside public input. While McKinney did believe there was room for
public dialogue during the CAG meetings, his idea that CAG members canvas their
communities suggests that considerably more public input could occur. Lynn and Kartez
(1998) support the idea that CAG’s often work in isolation from their communities, as is
the case in Indianapolis according to McKiimey. They also indicate that the ability of the
CAG to conduct outreach into the community will be dependent on the resources
provided by Veolia and the partnership.

Conclusion
Study participants’ views on the first two and a half years o f the partnership were
complex. In order to organize the results that emerged, the following list presents the key
findings of this chapter:
1) Ongoing public ownership, improved water quality, superior customer service
standards, and the rate freeze were the most often-cited benefits of the
partnership.
2) A host of perceived concerns emerged fi’om the interviews, including water
issues, doubts about the finances of Veolia and the City, false claims about
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employee benefits, diminishing employee morale, a lack of accountability
between the partners, and inadequate contract oversight. Some of these
concerns, such as diminishing morale, suggest distrust in Veolia’s attitude
towards its employees and a preference for local ownership and management,
either public or private. A lack of transparency and honesty on the part of the City
also emerges with regards to false promises about employee benefits.
3) Public comment at public meetings, direct communication through emails and
phone calls, and membership on the advisory groups are the three primary
avenues for public participation in the partnership,
4) Some study participants believed that Veolia has been more receptive to public
input than the City, and especially the Board of Waterworks. This suggests a lack
of accuracy with regards to common perceptions of “public” versus “private.”
5) There was strong sentiment that the Board of Waterworks has discouraged
public input into its operations. The timing of the public comment period at
the end of the meeting was suggested by one participant as a possible source
of this frustration.
6) The advisory groups were modeled after similar groups that exist to advise the
Indianapolis sewer system partnership. A lack o f publicity, however, has led
to m in im al public involvement in the groups beyond the members themselves.
7) Tying the CAG’s yearly evaluation of Veolia to a percentage of Veolia’s
incentive payments may represent a new development in how the public can
influence a private corporation’s operations. Veolia also seems responsive to
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creating a successful CAG (although defining “success” for the CAG is beyond
the scope of this study and a topic in need of further research).
8) One-third of the study participants did not think the various public comment
periods (i.e., at the CAG, TAG, and Board of Waterworks meetings) provided
sufficient opportunity for public input.
9) Both the TAG and the CAG got off to a slow start but appear to be improving
with time. The majority of study participants knew very little, however, about
the advisory groups’ operations.

These results suggest that there is potential for the public to have effective forums
to offer their input into the partnership, but these avenues have not been adequately
developed yet. The CAG, according to one of its members, has expressed a desire to truly
serve as liaisons between the communities they represent and Veolia. Since the CAG is
mandated by the partnership contract, and is responsible for a percentage of Veolia’s
incentive payments, the CAG’s continued development as a forum for public input and
influence offers hope for “authentic” public participation in the partnership. The Board of
Waterworks, on the other hand, was the focus o f continued fiustration by study
participants. Since the Board is the governing public body for the partnership, improving
public participation in this forum would be valuable. Given the broad spectrum of
concerns expressed by study participants, there are clearly a host of issues that could be
addressed by the Board. This could increase the transparency between the partnership and
the public and also alleviate the “skepticism” and “distrust” of the Board expressed in the
interviews.
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CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSION; WHAT HAVE WE LEARNED?

This study is an initial effort to research a U.S. city that is currently engaged in a
water supply public-private partnership with a TNC, specifically the partnership between
Veolia and the City of Indianapolis to operate and manage the Indianapolis Water
Company. Furthermore, given the cautions and suggestions in the literature about public
participation in these partnerships, I chose to focus on how the public is fitting in to the
dynamics o f this partnership. Thus, my central research question was: to what extent
were public participation processes authentic in the formation of the IWC partnership,
and what are the prospects for ongoing authentic participation as the partnership
continues? Given the review of relevant literature and theory in Chapter Two, and the
research findings presented in Chapters Four and Five, what have we learned to assist in
answering this question? What significant themes emerged fi-om the research findings?
Which of these themes are supported by the literature and which ones represent new
issues that have not been thoroughly considered yet? These questions are the focus of this
final chapter. First, I summarize the main ideas presented in the review of literature and
theory, followed by a review o f the key research findings. Then, I tie the two together and
propose possible implications. Finally, I suggest areas for future research and offer some
concluding thoughts.
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L iterature and Theory in Review
The availability of clean, safe water is an issue that affects every living thing.
Such an important subject has received scrutiny, study, and research from a myriad of
angles and perspectives. All of these approaches contribute to a better understanding of
how human society can provide safe, affordable water to everyone, an important
endeavor given the millions of people around the globe who currently lack access to this
most essential resource. This study is about a very small part of these larger water issues,
namely the recent trend o f transnational corporations (TNCs) entering the U.S. water
market and forming public-private partnerships with U.S. cities to manage their water
utilities.
The term “water privatization” encompasses a range of circumstances, including
the outright ownership of a water system by a private corporation, as briefly described in
Chapter One with respect to Cochabamba, Bolivia, and the public-private partnership
described here, a case in which the public owns the utility but a private corporation
operates and manages it. Water privatization first gained momentum outside of the U.S.
in Third World countries, where governments have implemented water privatization as
loan conditions from global institutions such as the World Bank and the IMF. In the last
eight years, however, the TNCs that own or operate water systems around the world have
entered the U.S. market. While private utilities have existed in the U.S. for a long time,
they have tended to be small to medium-sized and locally or regionally owned. It is only
recently that cities have formed public-private partnerships with TNCs for their water
utilities and signed contracts for up to twenty years. A small literature has emerged
evaluating these partnerships and the general trend of water privatization in the U.S.,
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inciuding a report by the Pacific Institute for Studies in Development, Environment, and
Security (Gleick et al. 2002) and a book by the National Research Council (NRG 2002).
Nonetheless, while these evaluations are helpful for providing an overview, they offer
only limited evidence from U.S. cities to support their arguments. Thus, one aim of this
study was to gather more detailed information about a U.S. city and its water partnership
in an effort to further bridge the divide between theory and practice.
One issue previous reports discuss is the involvement of the public in water
partnerships. Gleick et ai. (2002:42) emphasize the importance o f ensuring that
negotiations are “open, transparent, and include all affected stakeholders.” Furthermore,
they stress that the inclusion of stakeholders is essential for the long-term success of these
partnerships. They state that, “Broad participation by affected parties ensures that diverse
values and varying viewpoints are articulated and incorporated into the process,” and that
without this participation partnerships can be “perceived as corrupt and not in the best
interests of the public” (Gleick et al. 2002: 42). Similarly, the NRG (2002:103) advises
that, “Strategies for improving water utility performance must be implemented within a
local political environment shaped by the values and interests of the community and
elected officials.” Thus, the second part of my research focus related to public
participation in a U.S. water partnership.
A review of public participation literature revealed a series of key issues in this
area. These include the importance of defining the “public” and “participation,”
identifying avenues for participation, the timing and “authenticity” o f participation
(which I used to help frame my central research question), and analysis of specific types
o f participation such as the public hearing or advisory groups. Privatization literature also
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revealed a series o f theoretical foxindations for both proponents and critics. With a basis
in market and public choice theory, privatization proponents focus on the benefits of
increased efficiency at the utility, increased competition within the private sector, and the
removal of politics fix>m decisions. Critics of privatization, on the other hand, argue from
a foundation o f market failure theory. They focus on equity, accountability, externalities,
utilities as natural monopolies, and a lack o f competition given the large capital
investments needed to move between industries.

A Discussion of the Key Research Findings
The research findings were presented chronologically, with Chapter Four
describing the participants’ views on the decision-making process that created the
partnership, and Chapter Five focusing on the partnership’s first two and a half years. In
an effort to synthesize the findings o f these two chapters, the following is a consolidated
summary and discussion o f the key findings.
Positive working relationships were the most often-cited benefit of the decision
making process. Given that the City-County Council and hired consultants emerged as
the primary participants in the process, these relationships largely did not include
concerned members o f the public. There was only one official public hearing about the
decisions, along with normal public comment periods at City-County Council meetings,
leading to m in im a l public participation overall. Furthermore, some participants indicated
that public input was not taken seriously and even discouraged. This stands in stark
contrast to Gleick et al.’s (2002:42) recommendation to “include all affected
stakeholders” in contract negotiations, and suggests in this case an absence of efforts to
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include any stakeholders beyond those in the City-County government. This led to
“unauthentic” participation overall. If broader participation had occurred, perhaps there
would not be so much skepticism about the decisions. Study participants also expressed a
variety of concerns about the decisions themselves, including that the City paid too much
for the utility, the process was “steered” towards selecting Veolia, and the April 30*
deadline was not legitimate, among others. These concerns are linked by their general
indication that the process was less than transparent, leaving many questions unanswered
about the reasons for the decisions. This lack of transparency is not surprising given how
little public participation occurred. Finally, Indianapolis’ history and a desire for local
control emerged as the two most often-cited reasons for why these decisions were made.
The strong history o f privatization and pubhc-private partnerships in Indianapolis may
provide some clue as to why so little public participation occurred. Had the partnership
been a new policy alternative, compared to a familiar one, perhaps decision-makers
would have involved the public more in the decisions. This does not excuse the lack of
public participation; rather, it provides a possible reason why participation was so
minimal. Overall, discussion o f the decision-making process centered on both the process
itself and the outcome o f the decisions. Furthermore, the concerns focused on the lack of
transparency in the process and doubts about the legality of the outcome.
Discussion of the first two and a half years of the partnership led to similar and
different issues. On the one hand, transparency is still a concern, especially fi’om the
perspective of leaders for the employees o f the IWC. Although the lengthy and wellpublicized legal battle over alleged lost benefits was settled in the City’s favor, doubts
about this outcome remain. In addition, indications o f diminishing morale among the

133
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

workforce are of continuing concern. Decreased morale also suggests possible impacts a
TNC can have on a utility when it takes over an established, tight-knit workforce. The
IWC has always been locally-situated, largely well-thought of, and without significant
operational issues, leading to a sense of pride among its employees. Participants
described Veolia’s rhetoric when they began the paitnership as arrogant and
condescending in that Veolia made claims about transforming the IWC into a “world
class utility” when employees and others already felt it was “world class.” The negative
impacts o f this type of rhetoric may be important for future partnerships to consider.
The main avenues for participation in the partnership are public comment periods
at public meetings and membership on one o f the advisory groups. Lack of publicity
about these forums, however, has led to minimal knowledge of their existence and little
public input into the partnership overall. The Board of Waterworks, in particular, was
cited as a particularly frustrating forum because public comment has been actively
discouraged and the public comment period is relegated to the end of the meeting after
decisions have been made. A broad set o f concerns about the partnership emerged from
the interviews (e.g. decreased water quality, inadequate contract oversight, and a lack of
accountability between the partners). This suggests that, similar to the decision-making
process, partnership leaders have not been effectively communicating the reasons for
their decisions. In addition, it suggests that the public may have concerns about the
partnership that need to be sought out, acknowledged, and dealt with.
In this case, the advisory groups are interesting because they are mandated by the
partnership contract and the CAG’s yearly evaluation is responsible for a percentage of
Veolia’s incentive payments. Overall, the CAG and TAG began slowly with uncertainty
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about how the members were chosen. The TAG, however, has been operating well and
the two TAG members who were interviewed expressed positive, optimistic thoughts
about the TAG’s future. At the time o f the interviews, the CAG was undergoing a
“restructuring” due to the expressed desire of its members to refocus their energies and
redefine their mission. The general sentiment was that the CAG spent too much time
reacting to Veolia’s agenda and not enough time actually conveying the concerns and
views of the represented communities. This inability to define their own agenda is cited
by Vari (1995) as a common problem among advisory groups.
Overall, participants spoke more positively about Veolia’s support for public
input into their operations than they did about the Board of Waterworks. For instance,
one participant, a vocal citizen activist, described being asked out to lunch by the
President o f Veolia’s Indianapolis operations to discuss ways Veolia could work with
conservationists. In contrast, another participant described being denied his right to speak
at a Board of Waterworks meeting. While these may be isolated events, they do raise
questions about the traditional definitions of “public” and “private,” and are perhaps due
to the meshing of responsibilities and duties in a public-private partnership. Although
Veolia is a private corporation, it is required to cultivate and accept public input into its
operations, something most corporations do not have to do. Additionally, at least in this
contract, a small amount o f its earnings are also dependent on the evaluation of a group
o f citizens, another anomaly in the private sector. What could this blurring of public and
private mean? This question and some of the main issues described above are the focus
o f the next section where I discuss possible implications of the key research findings.
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Possible Implications
The lack of transparency in the decision-making process, and to an extent
continuing with die partnership, runs counter to the recommendations and suggestions
made by Gleick et al. (2002) and the NRC (2002). In this case, transparency could have
been achieved by conducting public outreach throughout the decision-making process to
inform Indianapolis citizens about the management options being considered. This could
have been followed by opportunities for concerned citizens to provide their input before
the decisions were made, and adequate follow-up on the suggestions that were
incorporated and those that were not. City-County Councilors and groups such as the
Marion County Alliance o f Neighborhood Associations could have assisted with this
outreach and public input effort.
Certainly, there are differences between public participation in a finite decision
making process and an ongoing partnership (which is also finite but exists for twenty
years). These differences include the appropriate type of participation, the amount of
money and effort needed to ensure “authentic” participation, the role participation plays
in decision-making, and the amount of time the participation lasts for. Roughly nine
months passed between the City’s letter of intent to buy the IWC and the actual sale and
creation of the partnership. In contrast, the partnership has twenty years to fine-tune and
improve on public participation in its operations. Although by no means impossible,
adequate transparency by the City-County government during the decision-making
process would have required a concerted effort and strong leadership. This may have
included proactively seeking out those citizens and groups who City leaders knew would
likely have an interest in how the IWC is managed, as suggested by one of the study
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participants. Clearly, among some of the study participants, the absence of this kind of
effort created skepticism and distrust in the decision-making process, resulting decisions,
and the ongoing partnership. In addition, active discouragement of participation in the
process further exacerbated these perceptions. In the case of a public-private partnership
with a long tenure, such as that for a water supply, encouraging public participation from
the beginning (i.e. the beginning o f the decision-making) could be viewed as an
investment in the public’s trust and confidence in the partnership over the long term.
While this trust is not guaranteed by investing in participation, it is certainly more likely
to happen by including the public in decisions. Similarly, King et al. (1998:3) describe
“deep and continuous involvement” in decision-making processes as being essential for
“authentic” participation. Especially when participation is mandated by a partnership
contract, as in the case of the advisory groups in Indianapolis, if members of the public
are already disheartened and cynical about participation from the decision-making
process, there may be ongoing difficulties in convincing them to participate and to
provide their input as the partnership continues.
The IWC partnership also offers some interesting dynamics with regards to
traditional definitions of “public” and “private,” In this case, it seems to be the private
partner that is encouraging and cultivating public participation more than the public
partner. WTiat are the implications o f this? One possible implication is the irrelevance of
these traditional definitions in the case of a public-private partnership. Perhaps when
public governments and private corporations form partnerships to manage a public
resource, their responsibilities become so intertwined that the conventional definitions
can become blurred. WTiat is traditionally considered a public concern, such as public
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participation, can become a private concern. In Indianapolis, this blurring has occurred
such that the private partner is acting more positively about public participation than the
public partner, who is either indifferent to or discouraging participation. There is
certainly room for improvement in this case, such as the need to publicize the advisory
group meetings more thoroughly and be more open about how advisory group members
are chosen. In addition, this blurring may not occur with many or most partnerships;
however, that public-private partnerships create the circumstances for this type of
blurring is significant. Finally, the evidence in this study does nothing more than suggest
this blurring, and its extent remains an open question in this case.
Lastly, the frequent concerns raised about the employees of the IWC highlight an
area o f public-private partnerships that is not addressed adequately in the literature. The
NRC (2002) briefly mentioned “workforce” concerns as an important area of
consideration, but did not delve further into the topic. By contract, in the case of the IWC,
this has been a high-profile and contentious issue. The class-action lawsuit filed by four
employees generated ongoing publicity. The first six months of the paitnership saw a
large number o f complaints to the National Labor Board. There were threats of a strike at
one point Employee morale has been declining since the partnership began. And there
has been downsizing o f the workforce. Given the unique nature o f the IWC partnership,
where IWC employees were transferred from one private corporation to another, the
perception that their benefits decreased (although this is disputed) has understandably
been an area of concern. The exact opposite could be the case in some partnerships,
where employees benefit fi-om the change o f employer. Clearly, though, if there is a
chance that employees will financially suffer firom the change, the partnership needs to be
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especially cognizant of their openness and honesty with the employees about these
changes. In addition, the contract itself is an important tool for protecting employees.

Recommendations
The final question I asked of the study participants inquired about their
reconunendations to other communities considering public-private partnerships for the
management of their water supply (Appendix F is a brief summary of their responses).
Since the study participants had all done a considerable amount of reflection on their
experiences with the IWC partnership, I wanted to give them the chance to share their
expertise and the lessons they have learned with others. Their recommendations can be
summarized as follows (with more details in Appendix F):
1) Conduct thorough research during the planning and negotiations stage.
2) Incorporate adequate public involvement during the decision-making process
and in the ongoing partnership
3) Take care of utility employees.
4) Have a long-term vision for the utility that the partnership falls within.

Given my perspective, I also want to offer a few recommendations of my own to
the IWC partnership. These suggestions are based on my synthesis of the interviews and
my own perspective on the events that have occurred in Indianapolis. Also, these
recommendations are rooted in Indianapolis in that they are primarily forward-looking
and speak to the ongoing partnership, not the decision-making process to form the
partnership. My recommendations are as follows:
1) Move the public comment period at public meetings related to the
partnership to the beginning of the meetings. While this is a small change, it
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allows concerned citizens the opportunity to comment on agenda items before
Üiey have been decided upon. This contributes to authentic participation in that
citizens may actually have the opportunity to influence the outcome of decisions.
Furthermore, if there is an agenda item that may be controversial, consider having
a separate public comment period for further discussion and input on that
particular item.
2) As the CAG and TAG members start to end their terms of service, choose new
members through an open, transparent process. Allow interested citizens to apply
for membership on these groups and sufficiently advertise these openings through
print media, the radio, and neighborhood associations. Choosing members
through a closed process invites suspicion and distrust in the motivations of
advisory group members.
3) Design and implement a more effective plan for publicizing the advisory group
and Board of Waterworks meetings, especially those of the Citizens Advisory
Group. The CAG has great potential for being an active and authentic mechanism
for public participation in the ongoing partnership. This plan could include
advertising meeting times and locations at community centers and neighborhood
association meetings, or even including a meeting schedule with water bills. In
addition, meetings should be held in locations vrith free parking and at a
convenient time for working citizens.
4) The employees o f the IWC are its greatest resource and asset. Given the history
of the IWC as a private corporation, the numerous changes IWC employees have
had to endure in recent years, and the class-action lawsuit that was filed on the
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employees’ behalf regarding lost benefits, Veolia and the Board of Waterworks
need to actively and aggressively try to regain or retain the employees’
confidence and respect. Low employee morale could have serious consequences
such as increased employee turnover, employees unwilling to put forth extra
effort in times of crisis, and poor union relations. While I am not suggesting
these efforts are not currently being made, they certainly need to continue in the
future.
5) If a citizen or citizens’ group expresses an interest in the IWC partnership, the
Board of Waterworks and Veolia need to honestly and legitimately consider their
viewpoint and concerns. By creating spaces A^s^ere concerns can be aired (such as
at Citizens Advisory Group meetings), and responding to these concerns in one
way or another, misperceptions about the partnership and its operation can be
limited.
6) Consider conducting a public relations campaign that highlights the successes
of the first few years of the partnership, acknowledges misperceptions, concerns,
and problems and how these are being addressed, and provides information on
how citizens can provide their input. This could involve taking an advertisement
out in local newspapers or including a flyer in water bills.

With respect to other communities that may consider this type of public-private
partnership for their water supply in the future, I also have a few recommendations, some
o f which are similar to those voiced by the study participants. These suggestions include:
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1) Design and implement a decision-making process that is transparent and open.
Include concerned citizens and citizen groups in the process and seriously
consider their concerns and ideas. This is an investment that will lead to less
skepticism o f the partnership and its operations in the future. Even if only a few
citizens step forward, honestly consider their ideas, and offer feedback on
whether their ideas were incorporated into the final decision or not. If this
feedback is not offered, they will feel ignored and are more likely to express their
concerns again in more public forums and arenas.
2) Thoroughly research all of the management options and be prepared to explain
these options to concerned citizens if necessary. Also, be prepared to explain in
general terms why a certain option is chosen.
3) If another municipality is engaged in a partnership with one of the corporations
being considered, contact them and ask for their input. What has their experience
been with this corporation? Are there any provisions of their contract they would
change if they could?

Further Research
There are many areas for Anther research revolving around water privatization
and public participation. Given that all partnerships are unique and the creation of water
supply partnerships remains relatively new in the U.S., more case studies such as this one
would be helpful for further understanding the variety of relevant issues to these topics. A
comparison of partnerships would assist in establishing common areas of benefits and
concerns. Additionally, studying U.S. partnerships at different points in their existence, at
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their beginning, middle, and end, could provide a useful temporal perspective. This
would also provide some insight into how these partnerships change and evolve over
time. Tracking the TNCs that recently entered the U.S. water market, in terms of the
partnerships they are part of, common concerns and benefits across partnerships, further
acquisitions and growth, and their involvement in the Third World, is another important
topic that deserves continued study. There are also partnerships that exist to manage
sewer and wastewater systems - in what ways are these similar and different to the
partnerships being established for the water supply? Finally, further investigation into the
public’s involvement in these partnerships would be useful. This could include continued
inquiry into the blurring o f traditional definitions o f public and private and how this
relates to public involvement into the partnership. Is this a common occurrence with
partnerships, or an anomaly in Indianapolis? Also, are there examples of governments
and partaerships that have successfully incorporated “authentic” public participation into
their decision-making processes? Of course, all of these suggestions for future research
are predicated on the assumption that water supply partnerships will continue and perhaps
increase in the U.S. While projections of increased involvement of the private sector in
the U.S. water supply exist, it remains to be seen vdiether they will come to pass. One
participant in this study commented, “As these [partnerships] have wound down, the
bigger companies are saying, ‘We don’t think this is a good business. We’re not going to
bid on these jobs anymore because o f the nature of the politics’... and so I think it was a
good experiment.” Even if water privatization in the U.S. turns out to be a failed
experiment, however, public-private partnerships will remain a policy option for
municipalities for a variety of services.
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Conclusion
The intersection of water privatization and public participation in Indianapolis has
thus far produced mixed results. Some of these results have reflected cautions and
concerns found in tiie literature, while others represent hopeful, positive developments.
How the IWC partnership evolves with respect to general areas o f concern and public
involvement remains to be seen. The fact that public participation through the advisory
groups is mandated by the partnership contract offers hope that the public will have a
viable, authentic avenue for raising concerns and offering input in the future. In addition,
it is my hope that other municipalities and partnerships can learn from the experiences,
both positive and negative, of the Indianapolis partnership.
After all, it is the sharing of ideas, insights, and experiences that offers the most
hope for achieving the ultimate goal in all of this: providing a safe, dependable,
affordable water supply to people and communities around the globe. Involving the
private sector in the management of the water supply, what many consider to be our most
important public resource, is one idea that has gained considerable momentum in recent
years. The IWC partnership, therefore, is one of many examples of this idea put into
practice. A constant examination of the viability of these partnerships, in aU of their
diversity, and the retention of public involvement in decisions about the water supply,
will be important for ensuring that our water remains safe, dependable, and affordable far
into the future.
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APPENDIX A
Interview Guide
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this interview. I am a graduate student at the
University of Montana and part o f my master’s thesis is looking at the public-private
partnership between the Indhanapolis Water Company and Veolia, both how the decision
was made to form this partnership and how the partnership has been working these past
two years. As someone who has been a part of this process in Indianapolis, I am
interested in knowing your perspective on what transpired here.
Before we get started, I just need to ask you two things. First, I will be writing a report of
my findings and I hope to include your opinions and knowledge in this report. Would you
like to keep your identity confidential in this report, or any others, which may result fi'om
this research?
If NO, WAIVES RIGHT OF CONFIDENTIALITY: Okay, then, with your permission, I
may use some of your identifying information in any reports I write or presentations I
give in the future.
If YES, REQUESTS CONFIDENTIALITY: Then, I will keep your identity entirely
confidential during this research. Any reports vrill use a pseudonym.
Second, if it is OK with you, I would like to tape record the interview. Taping ensures
that your views are accurately recorded and allows me to listen more carefully to what
you have to say. Is that OK with you? IF YES, TURN ON RECORDER.
I would just like to start by hearing about the history o f your involvement with what
occurred with the Indianapolis Water Company both in 2002 and up to the present day.
1. C an you tell me a bit about how and when you first became Involved with this
Issue?
Probe: Ask for clarification o f details that are not sufficiently explained.
Their specific role...
Repeat back what they’ve said if necessary
2. In 2002, the city decided to contract with a private company to manage the w ater
and sewer system. Can you tell me how the city came to that decision?
Probe: Who participated in the process?
Who supported the decision?
Was there any controversy?
Who was objecting?
How did they make their objections known?
Were their concerns addressed? How?
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3. What do you think went well during the decision-making process?
4. What do you think could have been improved about the decision-making process?
Probe: Were your concerns addressed or incorporated into the decision-making
process and/or contract negotiations?
How? How not? Why?
5. Ultimately, why do you think the city decided to contract with a private company
to manage the water company?
Now I would like to switch gears a little bit and talk about the present day and the current
situation that the water company is in.
6. Based on your experience, what benefits, if any, do you see to the private
management of the water utility?
Probe: Any others?
7. What concerns, if any, do you have about the private management of the water
utility?
Probe: Any others?
8. My understanding is that there are three main entities that provide opportunities
for public comment and input regarding the ongoing management of this
partnership. They are the CAG, TAG, and the Waterworks Board. Is that correct?
Do you think these entities provide sufficient opportunity for public input into this
process?
My last couple o f questions relate to the bigger picture.
9. Many communities across the U.S. are considering public-private partnerships
like Indianapolis's for management of their water utilities. Do you think that this
trend is generaify positive, negative, or neutral, and why?
10. Finally, based on your experiences and observations, are there any
recommendations you would make to these other communities as they begin to
consider this option?
11. Is there anyone else that you think I should talk to about this?
If I have any additional questions or need clarification of anything, would it be okay
to contact you in the future?
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Thank you so much for agreeing to talk with me and participating in this study. I really
appreciate it. I will be writing up a short summary of my findings along w^th my larger
master’s thesis. Would you like a copy of this summary when I am finished?
If you have any questions or additional comments in the future, I can be reached at this
phone number and email address (HAND THEM “BUSINESS CARD ).
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APPENDIX B
Synopsis of Study Participants

Public Officials
1. Beulah Coughenour - on City-County Council at time of decision in 2002 (Chair of
Public Works Committee that oversaw much of die initial work to buy the water
company) and generally pro-public-private partnership; currently a member o f the Board
of Waterworks that oversees the Indianapolis Water Company but no longer on the
Council
2. Jim Bradford - on Cily-County Council at time of decision in 2002 and still is today;
was one o f the few Councilors to voice opposition to the partnership and has continued
this throughout the last two and a half years
3. Jerry W ebb —Director of the Gas/Water/Sewer Division at the Indiana Utility
Regulatory Commission at the time of the decision and still is today; involved in informal
meetings with the City and Veolia concerning the partnership

CUy/Veolia Employees that oversee contract
4. Carlton C urry - the one City employee who’s entire job is to oversee the contract
between the City and Veolia; was a freelance consultant at the time of the decision and
advised the City on various details of the whole transaction and forming the partnership;
was on the Board o f Waterworks at the beginning o f its existence but is not anymore
5. Jean-M ichel Seillier - Veolia’s counterpart to Carlton Curry; oversees the contract
from Veolia’s side; a long-time employee (—10 years) of Veolia and has lived around the
world overseeing contracts (Malaysia and Australia most recently) for them; only
foresees being in Indianapolis a few more years and then he will probably move on
somewhere else

TAG/CA G members
6. Lester McKinney - Citizens Advisory Group member from its formation to today;
works for the Visitors and Convention Bureau in Indianapolis
7. Dick V anFrank - Technical Advisory Group member since its formation; is also on a
TAG for the partnership to run the Sewer Company (formed in the early 90’s); former
chemist for Eli Lilly
8. Glenn P ra tt - member of the Technical Advisory Group; former EPA employee;
successfully pushed for the creation of the CAG and TAG when the contract was being
negotiated but still has deep concerns about ongoing public participation
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CÜizenÆnvironmental Activists
9. C larke Kahlo —Program Director for local conservation group Protect Our Rivers
Now; has been very vocal (attending meetings, writing letters to the editor, etc.) agEiinst
the partnership and pushing for more long-term water conservation measures and plans in
Indianapolis watershed; also on the Board for the Hoosier Environmental Council
10. Tim Maloney —Executive Director o f the Hoosier Environmental Council, one of the
organizations involved in the Citizens Water Coalition in Indianapolis
11. Jack M iller —local investigative reporter who has written a series of articles for a
local alternative paper about the partnership; on the Board of the Hoosier Environmental
Council and Director o f the Indiana Alliance for Democracy

Current/Former employees o f IWCÆeolia and Union
12. Tom Plum m er - long-time employee of the water company (~25 years); in
management thus he is a non-union employee; the lead plaintiff in the Class Action
lawsuit filed against the city over lost benefits and pension after the partnership formed;
has been called a “whistle-blower” although he hasn’t lost his job yet (but wouldn’t be
surprised if he did)
13. Bob Reed/Chris B arton (interviewed together) —the President and Business
Manager, respectively, for the main union at the IWC; have been trying to negotiate a
new union contract for almost a year but they had not signed one as of August 2004
14. Joe Broyles —President of the IWC when it was sold to the City but retired during
the sale
15. Alan Kimbelt —former Vice President for Marketing at the IWC (retired in the
1990s) and one of the initial members of the Board of Waterworks; was “forced” off,
according to some study participants, after he wrote a critical opinion column in the
new sp^er about the partnership

Legal perspective
16. John Price - lawyer that handled the employees’ class action lawsuit; is also
litigating a lawsuit brought by citizens that challenges the city’s authority to create the
public-private partnership; believes that there is a UniGov statute that clearly states the
utility should have been put under the authority o f the public charitable trust that also
oversees the Gas company; a decision was given in September for the City but he is
currently trying to get it re tried outside of the County
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APPENDIX C
Unigov Statute Excerpts
From pp. 452-456 o f the Unigov Statutes
Section 8-1-11.1-1 Creation; board of trustees; directors; membership; appointment;
qualifications; tenure; proceedings, etc.
“Sec. 1 (a) In addition to the other executive departments of a consolidated city, there is
hereby created in any such city a department o f public utilities, which shall have as its
head and be under the general supervision and control of a board of seven (7) members,
to be known as the “Board o f Directors for Utilities,” to be appointed annually by the
board herein provided for and designated as the “Board of Trustees for Utilities.
“Sec. 1 (q) In the event such shall acquire in any manner herein provided more than one
(1) such public utility and the property thereof, said board o f trustees may add to such
board of directors from time to time...”
Section 8-1-11.1-3 Board of directors; powers and duties
“Sec. 3 (a) The board o f directors for utilities shall have, within and outside such city as
provided in this chapter, the exclusive government, management, regulation and control
o f all public utilities consisting of any waterworks, gasworks, electric light works,
heating and power plants of any kind or character, telephone and other systems of
communication, and local transportation systems of any kind operated upon, above, or
below any street or territory within the city... Any of which public utilities any such city
may acquire or construct for the service o f the public and consumers, users, or patrons,
and including any public utility and all properties which such city may hold as trustee for
the benefit o f the inhabitants o f such city.”

Source; Study participant Jack Miller gave me a photocopy of these particular statutes
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APPENDIX D
Text of Mayor Bart Peterson’s Letter to IWC Employees
July 18,2001
To all Indianapolis Water Company Employees;
As you know, the City o f Indianapolis has reached an agreement with NiSource to
purchase the assets o f the Indianapolis Water Company. City-County Council President
Dr. Beurt SerVaas and I believe that public ownership of the water company will
maintain low, reasonable water rates and local control and decision making over this
most important resource.
More important to you than this agreement is how it will affect your employment.
The City has committed to hiring a professional third party manager to operate the
water company efficiently.
First, the new management structure will honor the employee benefit agreements,
including the current bargaining units and collective bargaining agreements. Your
benefits, such as vacation and sick time, paid holidays, medical benefits, life insurance
and retirement programs, will not change.
Second, there are no plans for layoffs, and no major staff overhauls are
anticipated at this time.
Lastly, the new management structure will honor all agreements with Indianapolis
Water Company retirees. Retirees have put in years o f service and deserve to receive
their benefits.
I hope this letter answers your questions and makes it clear that we do not intend
to make widespread changes. We hope that the City's purchase of the water company
will instill stability and confidence in your job. We thank you for continuing service to
the citizens o f Indian^olis and central Indiana.
Sincerely,
Bart Peterson

Source: http://www.watercompanysuit.com/7%20Mayors%20Letter.PDF
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APPENDIX E
Membership of the Citizens and Technical Advisory Groups
Citizens Advisory Group members:
Regina M arsh, CAG President, Forest Manor Multi-Service Center
Fred Bagg, St. Francis Community Hospital & Health Centers
Faye Bradford, United North East Community Development Center
Ken Brasseur, Platinum Properties
Lillian Davis, Riverside Civic League
Steve Lains, Builders Association o f Greater Indianapolis (BAGI)
Rick Link, Perry Township Fire Department
Brian Lott, Fishers Fire Department
Lester McKinney, Indianapolis Convention & Visitors Association
Glenn Miller, Morgan County Rural Water Corporation
Yvonne Perkins, Citizens Gas & Coke Utility
Charles R atliff Town o f Brownsburg
Technical Advisory Group members:
Jane F rankenbui^er, Associate Professor, Purdue University
Josh Goode, Christopher B. Burke Engineering Ltd.
Vince GrifOn, VP Environmental & Energy Policy, Indiana Chamber of Commerce
Kevin H ardie, Executive Director, Friends of White River
Je ff Miller, Earth Day Indiana
Kay Pashos, Legal Department, Cinergy Corporation
Bill Beranek, Indiana Environmental Iiistitute
R ichard Van F rank, Audubon Society
Pam Thevenow, Marion County Health Department
Ray Snyder, National Starch
Denise Curtis, Environmental Manager National Starch & Chemical Co.
John Pankhurst, Working Group Member
Glenn P ratt, Consultant, Sierra Club

Sources: www.iwcr.com (CAG members) and
http://www6.indygov.org/dww/meetings/technical_group/members.htm (TAG members)
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APPENDIX F
Study Participants* Recommendations to Other Cities
Considering Water Privatization
1*RESEARCH (9 people)
A. Thoroughly research all of the management options (3 people)
B. Talk to other communities that have water supply partnerships (2)
C. Make sure you know all of the details of the present utility. Perform due
diligence and be “proactive” about this (2)
D. Research potential corporate partners and their past contracts and experiences
in the U.S. (2)
E. Talk to other unions that have been part of a partnership (1)
2. PUBLIC INVOLVEMENT (6)
A, Have an open decision-making process to form a partnership, with full
community involvement (3)
B. Form public advisory groups, especially in large cities (2)
1. With a Citizens Advisory Group, emphasize the importance of CAG
members bringing in issues from their communities, rather than reporting
to their communities (1)
3. EMPLOYEES (3)
A. Take care of the employees, for their sake and the utility’s sake (2)
B. Invest in adequate contract monitoring (1)
C. Off choices for transition to the employees (1)
4. LONG-TERM PLANNING (2)
A. Make sure you have a long-term vision for the water utility, including water
conservation (2)
5. OTHER (5)
A. The existing utility should make every effort to increase its efficiency before
exploring alternative management options (I)
B. Take plenty of time with the decision-making process (1)
C. Hold an open, honest, patient bidding process for private partners (1)
D. Make sure all promises are put on paper (1)
E. If it is possible, partner with a company that already has ties to your
community (1)
F. Only give up public control as a last resort, if absolutely necessary (I)
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